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Abstract 
More than ever before the European integration project reached a point of political 
and economic crisis that cannot be dismissed. The main academic and political 
solutions presented for the crisis is to refocus on European citizens, enhance their 
rights and make them part of the system, a move considered to be a response to 
democratic deficit. The present thesis takes the discussion one step further, by 
refusing to take Union citizenship as a status for granted. Instead, with the help of 
a critical Foucauldian perspective, it moves beyond the classical political and 
legal conceptualisations of citizenship, and tries to explain what and how Union 
citizenship was developed, for what reasons and with which implications. The 
main claim made here is that Union citizenship was gradually established as part 
of the advanced liberal governmental rationality of the EU, as a mechanism for 
incorporating European population in their government. This creates an ‘ideal’ 
normalised category of citizens, and also provides a space for expressing dissent 
towards the system. And in any case, the present crisis should be read as part of an 
ongoing process, not an end product. 
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1 Introduction 
 “The European dream is crumbling. Absolutely crumbling” shouted Nigel 
Farage, once again
1
. Under his well-known provocative mannerism lies a certain 
truth, which one cannot ignore. It seems nowadays that the European integration 
project reached a dangerous turning point. The recent economic and political 
crisis appears to have alienated European citizens from the European dream, as 52 
percent of the total average feels no attachment to the European Union [EU] 
whatsoever
2
. The ‘problem’ is usually defined as an issue of democratic deficit, 
with both scholars and officials presenting normative solutions that would make 
EU more democratic, accountable and legitimate (cf. Pollack 2010: 38-40). The 
citizenship of the EU [hereinafter Union citizenship] is perceived as a vital bridge 
for democratic legitimacy. As the conventional story goes, Union citizenship 
came into legal existence with Treaty of Maastricht [ToM], a status established 
deriving from and supplementing the nationality/ citizenship of Member States 
[MS], which grants particular rights to EU populations. With Union citizenship, 
European integration became a political project aiming at creating a community of 
people, not merely an economic project aiming for free market (Maas 2008: 583). 
As such, it is part of a symbolic package of measures
3
 that aims to create and 
enhance ‘European identity’ and a sense of belonging, which would help reinforce 
the political participation of citizens in EU affairs, as a source of legitimacy
4
 
(Bellamy 2008: 601; Lobeira 2012: 506). 
However, citizenship per se remains a contested concept. In scholarly terms, 
both in general and for EU in particular, citizenship has been studied by a variety 
of different angles, including sociology, history, political science, normative 
political philosophy, political sociology and legal scholarship (Wind 2008: 240; 
Meer 2010: 8; Shaw 2010: 5), which perplexes the discussion. In political theory, 
this touches upon the relationship between the individual and the society. It 
connects with “almost all political debates and controversies – the nature of 
justice, the proper realm of freedom, the desirability of equality, the value of 
politics, and so forth” (Heywood 2004: 15), and deeply divides the political 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
 Nigel Farage: The European dream is crumbling. [Electronic] Audio-visual version of EP Assembly, 12-03-
2014 session, available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j4FdbIVa2j0. Accessed 02-05-2014. 
2
 European Commission’s website. Standard Eurobarometer 80. [Electronic] Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb80/eb80_en.htm. Download date: 02-05-2014. 
3
 Others being the European passport, anthem and flag. 
4
 In practice, this rationality can be seen in the decision of Barroso II Commission to make 2013 the European 
Year of Citizens, dedicated to Union citizenship as an opportunity to celebrate its legal, political and symbolic 
power. This was part of a wider effort of this cabinet to make Union citizenship a political priority by focusing 
on the obstacles that citizens might confront in the enactment of their rights and proposing solutions that would 
remove them and thus guarantee democratic participation (cf. Shaw 2012: 13; European Commission 2013: 56). 
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thought (Heywood 2004: 32). Also, the conceptualisations of the ‘individual’ and 
the ‘society’ differ, as each theoretical tradition advanced different elements. 
Therefore, an epistemological and methodological question arises: how can 
one study Union citizenship if there is no accepted version of what is citizenship 
to begin with? To perplex the discussion even more, in relation to EU in general, 
how can we study European integration if Europe is not what is supposed to be? 
(cf. Walters and Haahr 2005b: 2). More questions can be raised here as well. What 
would a non-essentialist perspective on European integration say for Union 
citizenship? And again, how did Europe come to need a supranational citizenship? 
These questions intrigued me when I first start thinking about Union citizenship. 
So this is what I explore in my dissertation. To rephrase the research question, I 
wanted to learn more on what Union citizenship is, how it can be understood, 
how it was produced as such, and the rationalities it serves. 
I aim to tackle this multifaceted question with the help of a critical standpoint 
relying on Michel Foucault’s theoretical and methodological discussions. 
Conventionally speaking, the problem at hand seems very broad. Indeed, each of 
the sub-questions could serve as a research topic on their own. However, 
following a Foucauldian viewpoint, I want to explore Union citizenship as a 
whole by focusing on particular aspects of it. I will examine the common readings 
on Union citizenship and challenge them by focusing on the how and why of 
Union citizenship. As a status, it was never a pre-given. As I will discuss later on, 
in the beginning European integration rejected any need for democratic legitimacy 
based on citizens. Rather, Union citizenship was gradually developed as part of 
the (neo)liberal rationality promoted first by the European Court of Justice 
[hereinafter the Court], as a means for better governing Europe and European 
population. This government through citizenship and rights is achieved both 
through the normalisation of citizens based on law and other institutional 
practices, and through the space it creates for individuals to govern themselves. 
The Foucauldian perspective presents the needed critical standpoint for this 
exploration. 
The organisation of my thesis is clear. In Chapter 2, I present my reading of 
the political Foucault, where I discuss his ideas on knowledge, power, government 
and governmentality, as well as his methodological tools of archaeology and 
genealogy. Based on these I identify different features that an analytics of EU and 
Union citizenship should include. In Chapter 3, I begin with my analytics with the 
examination of the various normative and empirical political and legal discourses 
developed on Union citizenship. In Chapter 4, I present a history of European 
integration by retracing the dominant mentalities of government and the position 
of citizenship therein. In Chapter 5, I conclude my analytics by examining the 
state of Union citizenship in the government of Europe and the potentials it 
creates. I close my discussion [Chapter 6] with some concluding thoughts. The 
thesis should be read as a whole as it presents different aspects of the study.  
 3 
 
2 Foucault for the EU 
Up until the present, a multiplicity of European integration theories has been 
proposed that provide with the analytical tools explaining different aspects of EU 
(Pollack 2010: 16). In a recent development, scholars critically challenged 
traditional readings of European integration, which looked “increasingly out of 
touch with contemporary EU politics” (Manners 2007: 77), and presented 
alternative approaches. One of these approaches applies discourse analysis in the 
study of European integration (Wæver 2004), based on the reworking of the 
Foucauldian concept of discourse in what is called the Critical Discourse Analysis 
theory and methodology (cf. Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 12ff). As mentioned in 
the introduction, I want to tackle the problematic of Union citizenship following a 
critical perspective based on Foucault’s work. 
However, what I propose here has little to do with these discursive 
approaches. Rather, I want to retrace the political thoughts of Foucault and use 
them as a basis and guidance for my critical analytics of EU and Union 
citizenship. This is what I will in the rest of this chapter. First I will present 
Foucault as a political philosopher and briefly discuss his ideas on 
power/knowledge, government, and introduce the concept of governmentality 
[section 2.1]. Then I will present the methods he used in his work [section 2.2], 
and clarify some points that a Foucauldian research design should contain [section 
2.3]. I will conclude the chapter with the structure of my analytics of EU and 
Union citizenship [section 2.4]. 
2.1 Introducing political Foucault 
Foucault never saw himself as a political theorist, even though his work “contains 
a powerful, original, and coherent body of political ideas” (Gordon 2001: xi), 
which can be retraced in his monographs, lectures, courses and interviews. 
Certainly, the appreciation of his ideas depends on one’s particular philosophical 
and epistemological positioning. But in any case, his engagement with central 
subjects of political science, such as power and government, the questions he 
asked and the methodological tools he provided are useful and relevant for 
political analysis, even in not the most obvious ways (Simons 1995: 123; Brass 
2000: 305; May 2005). His thought is mainly situated in poststructuralism and/ or 
postmodernism (Agger 1991: 111; Manners 2007: 83), even though he personally 
 4 
 
rejected these labels (Foucault [1983] 1998: 435ff
5
). Most importantly, similarly 
to other critical theorists, his work stands as a critique to positivism and mainly 
the idea that it is “possible to reflect the world without presuppositions, without 
including philosophical and theoretical assumptions into one’s work” (Agger 
1991: 106). He was engaged in a critical work similar to that of Kant’s 
examination of Enlightenment (cf. Hendricks 2008), which he understood as an 
analysis of both us and our present that comes in total contrast to the Cartesian 
question of the subject as universal and unhistorical ([1982] 2001a: 335). From 
this standpoint, he rejected grand theories that think in terms of the totality as they 
“proved a hindrance to research” ([1976] 1980: 81). Instead, he was instead 
interested in the particular ‘knowledges of Man [sic],’ the knowledges related to 
what is a human being and what are their inner motivations, needs, wants and 
aspirations (cf. Brass 2000: 307). In particular he wanted to examine the processes 
that transform human beings into subjects in several instances ([1982] 2001a: 
326). It is in this exploration that he discussed the concept of power. 
2.1.1 Rethinking power 
Power is a constant theme throughout Foucault’s work. However, as he explained, 
it was not his initial intent to work on power, but came as a necessity since the 
available theories/models on power could not explain power relations and how 
power is exercised ([1982] 2001a: 327). The first model, which he called 
‘philosophico-juridical,’ can be found in the classical political theory ([1976] 
2001a: 122), and links power with sovereignty. Power here is perceived as a right 
that “one is able to possess like a commodity,” and to transfer wholly or partially 
through a legal act ([1976] 1980: 88). This model accounts for the ideal genesis of 
the state ([1975] 1997: 59), which is understood as the result of a contract 
between free individuals who decide to create the sovereign and give-up their 
power for the ultimate protection of their natural rights
6
. The second model of 
power, which he called ‘politico-historical’ can be found, for example, in classical 
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. Most of Michel Foucault’s works have been translated and published in English in several formats long after 
his death. Some of the courses he gave at Collège de France remain to the time of writing unpublished. 
Throughout my thesis I found it convenient to refer to edited anthologies containing parts of his work translated 
in English. Only these publications will appear in the full list of references by the end of the thesis. However, I 
decided to use a certain convention when referring to Foucault in the text. First, I avoid repeating his surname in 
the in-text citation. Second, I give two dates: the year in brackets is when the actual texts came out first and the 
second is the year of the English publication I referred to. Since I am not referring to particular titles for each in-
text citation, apart from few instances, I believe that this convention will help situate each text in the chronology 
of his works, and make them distinguishable. The chronology of his work as published first in French is: 1966 
The Order of Things [monograph], 1969 Archaeology of Knowledge [monograph], 1970/1 The Will to Know 
[course], 1971/2 Penal Theories and Institutions [course – English publication forthcoming], 1972/3 The 
Punitive Society [course – English publication forthcoming], 1973/4 Psychiatric Power [course], 1974/5 
Abnormals [course], 1975 Discipline and Punish [monograph], 1975/6 Society must be Defended [course], 1976 
The History of Sexuality vol. 1 [monograph], 1977/8 Security, Territory, Population [course], 1978/9 The Birth 
of Biopolitics [course], 1979/80 On the Government of the Living [course]. Foucault died in June 1984. 
6
 This is the core idea of the Social contract theories. For an introduction see Heywood 2004. 
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Marxism, and explains power in terms of force relations and war. Here the state is 
conceived as the result of battles, and the mentality of conflict constitutes “the 
secret driving force of institutions, laws, and order” ([1975] 1997: 61). The 
relations in this model are understood as those of domination and subordination. 
In Marx and Engels own words, the history of all existing society until now is the 
history of class struggles where the oppressor and the oppressed classes stand “in 
constant opposition to one another,” carrying on an uninterrupted fight (1978: 
473-4). 
Foucault challenged these models in their particularities. The ‘philosophico-
juridical’ discourse could not explain how power is exercise, merely interested in 
the legitimacy of power, and it presupposes the existence of the sovereign as a 
pre-given entity (cf. [1976] 1980: 95; [1977] 1980: 140). Similarly, even though 
the ‘historico-political discourse’ provided a sufficient criticism of positivism, by 
presenting how no universal subject can exist as the entire social body is placed in 
the one camp or the other ([1975] 1997: 61), we can still see the idea of the 
sovereign present as power is conceived as dominance of one group over the 
other. What is more, the power here can take the form of polemics, which 
Foucault called ‘parasitic’ expression of power with sterilising effects that can 
make someone believe that one can gain access to the absolute truth ([1984] 1997: 
112-3). Contrary to these discourses, he proposed the ‘microphysics of power,’ 
which can be better understood as a “heuristic set of methodological guidelines” 
than a systematised theory of power (Walters 2012: 14). These consist of several 
ideas on how power is exercised. 
Contrary to the ‘philosophico-juridical’ model, he maintained that power is 
not something that can be acquired, seized, or shared ([1976] 1978: 94). Instead, 
he identified “manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise and 
constitute the social body” ([1976] 1980: 93), and argued that power exists 
everywhere, never localised in one place, but regularly exercised throughout a 
network ([1976] 1980: 98), produced “from one moment to the next, at every 
point […] in every relation from one point to another” ([1976] 1978: 93). For 
Foucault, all relationships including economy, production, kinship, family and 
sexuality are inherently power relations ([1982] 2001a: 337). What is more, these 
power relations are immediately expressed as divisions, inequalities, and 
disequilibria ([1976] 1978: 94), which explains why the ‘historico-political’ 
discourse understands power in terms of conflict. However, as Foucault 
explained, they can take a multiplicity of forms other than the prohibition, 
punishment, and domination ([1977] 1980: 142). 
What is more, contrary to the positivist reference to a free and rational subject, 
individuals are understood as constantly situated in particular contexts (Bevir 
2010: 432). They are not pre-given entities, but “the product of a relation of power 
exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces” ([1976] 1980: 
73-4), the vehicles and not the points of application of power ([1976] 1980: 98). 
So, all parts participating in a power relation are perceived as equal subjects who 
can act until the very end ([1982] 2001a: 340). Power not a group of institutions 
and mechanisms that ensure the subservience, or a general system of domination 
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of one individual, group or class over another and a mode of subjugation with the 
form of the rule ([1976] 1978: 92-3). 
Foucault explained power as ‘conduct,’ which has to do with the way someone 
acts on the acts of others ([1982] 2001a: 340). As such, there are not distinctions 
between good, bad, moral, immoral, democratic or undemocratic exercises of 
power (Brass 2001a: 321). What is important in these ‘microphysics of power’ is 
to understand how power is conducted. So as Foucault explained, this is done 
based on the “production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a 
discourse” or a particular knowledge ([1977] 1980: 142). These knowledges can 
be found in theoretical texts, empirical instruments and also in practices and 
institutions, and they contain the rules that characterise their existence, operation 
and history ([1969] 1997: 7). These rules can be either characteristic of a 
particular place or time, or more general referring to a whole period ([1969] 1997: 
7). This is why Foucault made a distinction between different historical periods he 
named epistemes, which form particular discursive assemblages that divide 
statements and discourses between those that can be accepted as scientific and 
those that cannot ([1977] 1980: 197). 
To conclude, power and knowledge exist in multiplicity in each episteme. As 
Foucault explained, one can identify in a society several ‘subjugated’ knowledges 
that have been buried, disguised and disqualified as inadequate, and which can be 
revealed by criticism ([1976] 1980: 81-2), which exist in a relationship of 
permanent provocation and struggle with the dominant discourses and 
knowledges, what he called agonism ([1982] 2001a: 342). Similarly, the existence 
of power and power relations presumes and depends on the existence of plural 
points of resistance and counter-conducts, which are not exterior to the system of 
power relations ([1976] 1978: 95; [1977] 1980: 141-2). Particularly, in his 
research, he was interested in the discontinuities that can be found in the 
formulations of power/knowledge. To discover a discontinuity is ‘discovered’ 
means “to register a problem that needs to be solved” ([1978] 2000: 226) by 
asking how come such a discontinuity exists contrary to the “continuist image that 
is normally accredited” ([1976] 2001: 114). 
2.1.2 Government and governmentality 
Throughout his work, Foucault applied his ‘theory’ on power/knowledge in order 
to illuminate the different discontinuities in the understanding of humans and the 
ways they are objectified into subjects as already mentioned. Part of this work was 
his studies on government he offered during his courses at Collège de France. 
Following his work on power, Foucault dismissed classic political theory because, 
as Rose and Miller explained, the language of political philosophy cannot provide 
the tools for the study of the problems of government (2010: 299). Rather, his 
analytics of government opened up new dimensions in the theory of the state, 
even though it is better understood as a fragmentary sketch than an elaborate 
theory on the state (Lemke 2007: 45). 
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Government here has a similar meaning to power. It is better understood with 
its sixteenth-century broad meaning that referred to the system by which a thing is 
governed, which included governing children, souls, communities, families, the 
sick, up to the state itself: to govern means to “structure the possible field of 
action of others” ([1982] 2001a: 341). In relation to the state, Foucault was 
especially interested in what he called the process of ‘governmentalisation’ of the 
state, which started in the sixteenth century, and relates to the ways to govern and 
similarly of how not to be governed (Brass 2000: 315) in the context of the 
nation-state. For doing that he developed the concept of ‘governmentality,’ which 
provides the semantic linking between government and modes of thought (Lemke 
2001: 191). 
Following the discussion from the previous sub-section, governmentality is 
the united formulation of power-government and knowledge-mentality, denoting 
the different mentalities or ‘arts’ of government, the different rationalities guiding 
the act of governing. All in all, we can understand governmentality in four ways: 
(a) as the ‘conduct of conduct;’ (b) as a form of political analysis; (c) as a 
genealogical approach to the study of the state, of public policy and its effects; 
and (d) as the historically specific liberal form of power (cf. Walters and Haahr 
2005b; Bevir 2010: 424; Walters 2012: 11ff). Particularly the definition of 
governmentality as the ‘conduct of conduct,’ demonstrates how government 
involves attempts to shape aspects of a person’s behaviour according to particular 
sets of norms and for different ends (Dean, 2010: 18), that is the process of 
objectifying one as a subject. This has a dual expression: (a) as the act of 
conducting, i.e. leading the conducts/ behaviours of others and thus objectifying 
others into subjects [subjectification]; (b) as the act of self-conducting, i.e. the 
way in which one conducts and leads oneself and thus objectifies themselves or 
permits the conduct of others on them [subjectivation] (Gordon 1991; Hamann 
2009: 41; Sokhi-Bulley 2013: 232). Particularly in the case of the state, the goal is 
to construct the population in ways that would serve specific political purposes. 
To conclude, similar to what was said on power/knowledge, one can find a 
multiplicity of governmentalities, i.e. counter-conducts and counter-rationalities 
existing in the same period, which one needs to acknowledge in an analytics of 
government as they are necessary parts both for the formation and development of 
the governmentality (Cadman 2010: 540). In his studies, Foucault covered a 
significant timespan of the European history, from the ancient times up to the 
present, with particular focus on the developments that took place from the 
Classical period
7
 up to the twentieth century. In these analytics, he discussed a 
number of governmentalities, which I will discuss later [Chapter 4.1], for the 
purposes of my analytics of Union citizenship. 
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 Foucault refers to the Classical period throughout his work. This designates the historical period from 1660 up 
until the end of the nineteenth century, during which many of the characteristic institutions and structures of the 
modern world have been born. 
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2.2 Foucault’s methods of study 
For pursuing his anti-positivist exploration of the ways power/knowledge is 
expressed, in general and in the case of government, for the objectification of 
humans as subjects, Foucault used two methods
8
 in particular. Initially, he 
developed the method of ‘archaeology,’ which allowed him to deal with the 
practices, institutions and theories on the same level, and look for the underlying 
knowledges that make them possible ([1966] 1998: 262). This method is linked to 
Foucault’s exploration of knowledges, and the material for such research include 
everything that one can read, that is the knowledge of all institutions and practices 
([1966] 1998: 262), as a way of reconstructing the ‘subsoil’ of the episteme, of the 
general archive of the historical period ([1966] 1998: 263). In itself, ‘archaeology’ 
could not provide for causal explanations, and that is why Foucault later on 
developed Nietzsche’s method of ‘genealogy’ (cf. Gutting 2005: 45f). 
Genealogy is a multi-layered conceptual practice comprising many conceptual 
elements and theoretical and practical gestures. Saar (2002) understood genealogy 
(a) as a mode of writing history and historical method, (b) as a mode of evaluation 
and critique, and (c) as a textual practice and specific writing genre based on 
hyperbole and exaggeration (Saar 2002: 231f). Foucault defined genealogy as a 
“grey, meticulous, and patiently documentary” ([1971] 1998: 369), that, similarly 
to archaeology, requires patience and depends on a vast accumulation of source 
material ([1971] 1998: 370). In addition, genealogy as a way of writing history, is 
based on a form of radical historicism
9
 that which highlights: (a) nominalism – 
that any universals or generalised ideas are merely names without any 
corresponding reality; (b) contingency – that events and circumstances are 
possible, but cannot be predicted with certainty; and (c) contestability – that 
everything can be contested since there is no unified portrayal of it (Bevir 2010: 
426f). 
The object of genealogy is ‘events,’ i.e. not the significant decisions, treaties, 
reigns or battles of history, but rather the particular discontinuities and reversals in 
a power relationship that come out of luck and not destiny
10
 ([1971] 1998: 381). 
With a genealogy, the world is conceived as a profusion of entangled events, the 
“host of errors and phantasms” ([1971] 1998: 381), and the purpose of the 
genealogist is to “distinguish among events, to differentiate the networks and 
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 I refer to methods here rather than methodologies because they serve more like styles and ethos of research 
rather than clearly defined methodologies. For a very interesting companion to Foucault’s work, see Kendall and 
Wickham (1999). In this textbook/toolkit, the authors explore Foucault’s methods and present hands-on ways of 
applying these methods. 
9
 Historicism originally meant “an insistence on ‘getting inside’ a historical period in order to understand it, by 
learning the meaning of the language and concepts used in that period” (Allison 2009: 243). The predominant 
developmental/ progressive historicism of the 19
th
 century saw a sense of grand meaning and a progression in 
history towards an end – see for instance Hegel and the end of history or Marxism on teleology of communism. 
10
 In any case, decisions and treaties can serve as the texts containing the rationalities that indicate the 
discontinuities and reversals that interest genealogy. 
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levels to which they belong, and to reconstitute the lines along which they are 
connected and engender one another” ([1976] 2001a: 116). Thus, mode of writing 
history, genealogy is perceived as the ‘genuine’ history11 ([1971] 1998: 379), 
which rejects the “metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite 
teleologies,” and opposes the search of the origin of the event in favour of its 
descent and lineage, and its emergence, formation and development ([1971] 1998: 
370). Also, genealogy serves as a mode of evaluation and critique, as it helps 
denaturalise beliefs, actions and practises that are taken for granted and conceived 
as natural (Bevir 2010: 429). Genealogy serves as a ‘diagnostic’ of the present, as 
a history of the present rules, practices and institutions that objectify humans as 
subjects, and also as a refusal to read the past in terms of the present (Gutting 
2005: 50; Dean 2010: 3). 
2.3 A critical research design 
It would be interesting to see what a research design for the EU should include, 
based on Foucault’s theoretical work on power and government and his methods. 
A disclaimer should be made from the beginning. As aforementioned many times, 
Foucault never provided clear-cut theories. So, a Foucauldian analytics of 
government cannot compete with the theories of the state given by Marxists or the 
liberals (Valverde 2007: 177). The same applies for the EU. A Foucauldian 
research design would not compete with the fully-fledged theories of European 
integration or negate the ‘truths’ they provide. Also, it has been argued that the 
concept ‘governmentality’ cannot explain events in all societies, given the fact 
that different social bases and levels of development exist and that the different 
techniques of governmentality cannot be applied uniformly (Joseph 2010: 240f). 
What is more, studies on governmentality have been mainly focused at the 
domestic level (Walters and Haahr 2005a), and since Foucault’s analysis lacks 
theoretical resources, research should be enriched by complementary theories
12
 
(Saar 2002: 237). In contrast, Rose et al. claimed that the analytical tools in 
governmentality studies are flexible and open-ended, and what counts here is the 
ethos of the investigation, the way of asking questions, rather than the 
methodology (2006: 101). What is more, Foucault’s work met a great success in 
the English-speaking world with the development of the so-called 
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 Merlingen explained that a foucauldian research could be approached through a combination of discourse 
analysis and narrative process tracing. The latter can help understand genealogy in conventional terms. Contrary 
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outcomes (George and Bennett 2005: 6), as a way for the researcher to detect possible explanations for the 
outcome variable (George and Bennett 2005: 158), narrative process-tracing is interested in elaborating stories 
by connecting events in a meaningful way, thus demonstrating how phenomena are linked without providing 
“law-type explanations” (Merlingen 2011: 154). 
12
 For instance, several scholars called for an exploration of the links between Foucault’s governmentality and a 
certain anti-essentialist Marxism (cf. Milchman and Rosenberg 2002; Olssen 2004; Joseph 2010). 
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governmentality studies (cf. Donzelot and Gordon 2008; Elden 2007; Dean 2010; 
Walters 2012). I situate my work here in this group of studies. 
Taking everything into account, a research design based on Foucault’s 
thoughts should consist of a historical inquiry interested in the emergence, 
formation and development of the problem of interest, and that would aim to 
present the multiple mentalities of government related to it, the different 
expressions of power/knowledge, and the different knowledges and discourses 
produced explaining the problem at hand. Moreover, a critical analytics would 
take into consideration Foucault’s conceptualisation of power and his 
prescriptions he presented in several instances in his work on how to study power: 
1. There is no place outside the techniques of knowledge and the 
strategies of power. Thus should focus on the local centres where 
power/knowledge is expressed, and particularly examine the ways 
knowledge is produced for the exercise of power ([1976] 1978: 98). 
2. Even though the nation-state and its power are not to be negated or 
minimised ([1976] 1980: 72), the analytics of power should 
“necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state” ([1976] 2001a: 
122f), towards other locations where power/knowledge is expressed. 
As he explained, never before have there existed more centres of 
power, more attention manifested and verbalised, more circular 
contacts and linkages, and more sites of expression and spread of 
power that in the present ([1976] 1978: 49). 
3. Instead of searching for who has the power and who is deprived of it, 
we should examine the patterns of modifications of power/knowledge 
([1976] 1978: 99), that is the various transformations of the official 
governmentalities. Especially here, one should remember that there are 
no dominant and dominated conducts and discourses, but a multiplicity 
of them that relate to each other in a relationship defined as agonism. 
Moreover, a very useful and simplified framework of an analytics of 
government has been presented in the literature, which is concerned on explaining 
how government is done through the examination of four dimensions (cf. Haahr 
2004: 213; Dean 2010: 33): 
1. The forms of visibilities, i.e. the different ways objects are illuminated 
and defined through maps, charts, graphs and so on; 
2. The ways of thinking and knowledge, i.e. the rationality of 
government, including different forms of thought, knowledge and 
expertise; 
3. The techniques of practices, i.e. the techne of government that 
includes the means, mechanisms, procedures and instruments 
formulated based on the rationality of government, through which 
authority and rule are accomplished; 
4. The identities of the subjects, i.e. the individual and collective 
identities through which government operates. 
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2.4 Concluding remarks 
To conclude, a Foucauldian research design is essentially multidimensional. Dean 
(2004) reminds us of a particular thought-figure Foucault used in his work that 
could help us understand such an investigation on power and government: the 
ancient concept sumbolon, which indicated the parts of a whole platter [holon]. A 
critical analytics of power and government can be understood as an attempt to 
reconstruct the whole by putting the different halves back together. A practical 
example Foucault discussed was the case in Oedipus Rex Tragedy, where each 
character presented halves of the truth of the Oedipus that had to be placed 
together for reaching the whole ‘truth.’ The same applies here: the ‘truth’ has 
multiple dimensions that have to be retraced and put together. As Foucault 
explained, for analysing any particular event, one should retrace the multiplicity 
of processes consisting of this event by retracing the ‘polyhedron’ of 
intelligibility, i.e. the number of faces it consists of, which can ultimately be 
broken down in further parts (cf. [1978] 2001a: 227). 
Going back to the research question(s) that interest me in the present thesis, 
what I am proposing here is a Foucauldian analytics that would expose the 
different aspects related to Union citizenship, and help us understand what it is, 
how it is understood, how it was produced and for what reasons. In the following 
three chapters, I will try to present my analytics of EU governmentalities and 
Union citizenship. I divided my work in three parts. I will start with an 
archaeology of the different knowledges, discourses and models developed in 
relation to citizenship and for explaining Union citizenship in particular [Chapter 
3]. After I discuss their limitations, based on Foucault’s critical exploration of the 
models of power discussed previously, I will move on with a genealogy of 
Europe, where I will try to recreate a genuine story of the European integration by 
examining the different mentalities developed for the government of Europe, the 
struggles between them and the place of Union citizenship thereof [Chapter 4]. 
Finally, I will conclude my analytics with and exploration of the ways that Union 
citizenship was developed as a mechanism that enables the ‘best’ government of 
Europe possible [Chapter 5]. 
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3 An archaeology of citizenship 
Following the theoretical and methodological background presented, in this 
chapter I will discuss the various normative and empirical discourses and models 
developed in relation to Union citizenship. This first part of my analytics serves as 
a brief archaeology of the episteme surrounding Union citizenship. I start with the 
classical political reading of citizenship [section 3.1]. Then I explore the different 
conventional political and legal readings on Union citizenship [section 3.2]. Next 
I present some critical empirical challenges of Union citizenship [section 3.3]. I 
conclude the chapter with some thoughts on their relevance and limitations 
[section 3.4]. The discussion here is made in relation to my research question: are 
these discourses enough to explain what Union is, how it is produced as such, and 
the reasons it serves? 
3.1 Political theory of citizenship 
To reiterate a point made in the introduction, citizenship is an important recurring 
theme in political theory. As such, it establishes the relationship of the individual 
with the society by defining the political actors and the rules within which they 
operate (Maas 2008: 587). Citizenship is directly linked to the idea of the nation-
state: it is developed “through the linked processes of state-building, the 
emergence of commercial and industrial society, and nation-making” (Bellamy 
2008: 598). The general regime regulating citizenship was first defined in the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that established the concept of sovereignty for 
European nation-states (Rebel 2012: 49), and the modern conceptualisation of 
citizenship dates back to the historical period initiated with the development of 
liberalism in the late eighteenth century (Junevicius 2010: 41). Following this, the 
political theory discourses developed on citizenship are highly normative and their 
foundations can be traced back to the ‘philosophico-judicial’ model of power, 
with Bodin being the first to define the conceptual relationship between 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘citizenship’ (Rebel 2012: 49). 
In general, three normative discourses were developed surrounding what is 
citizenship: liberalism, communitarianism and republicanism (Rebel 2012: 56), 
which as expected, provide the ‘ideal’ objectification of humans as subjects-
citizens. In liberalism, citizenship status is defined in in individualistic terms 
(Yuval-Davis 1997: 69) as the equality of individual rights recognised and 
protected by the state and law (Kabeer 2012: 220). Here the main distinction made 
is between citizens and non-citizens, where the former gain the status and rights of 
citizenship by the virtue of being members of a political community. Following 
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the explanation the Social contract theorists on the formation of the state
13
, we can 
see the rationality that individuals are endowed with natural rights that derive 
from the natural law given to humankind “either by God or by nature” (Heywood, 
2004: 157), and that the sovereign nation-state has to act as “a neutral arbiter 
among competing groups and individuals in society” by promoting the ‘common 
good’ (Heywood 2005: 78-9) and protecting these rights (Heywood, 2004: 28). 
The communitarian model takes the discussion one step further by clarifying 
the essence of citizenship, which includes (a) liberal civil rights [legal protections 
provided to individuals and the private sphere under the sovereign], (b) political 
rights [for citizen’s participation in political life], and (c) social rights [with the 
development of the welfare state] (cf. Evers and Guillemard 2013: 4-5; Heywood 
2004: 207-208). All three categories of rights are conceived as interdependent and 
reinforcing one another. Furthermore, the communitarian model focuses on the 
social character of citizenship that relies on a sense of solidarity among citizens, 
and the civic responsibility towards the welfare of the community (Evers and 
Guillemard 2013: 5). Thus, citizenship is conceived as the status bestowed to all 
full members of a political community, which implies certain responsibilities in 
the pursuit of the collective good (Yuval-Davis 1997: 69; Meer 2010: 10; Kabeer 
2012: 220). This participatory aspect of citizenship is further promoted with the 
republican model, which focuses on the active involvement of citizens in the 
determination, practice and promotion of the common good (Yuval-Davis 1997: 
71). 
In sum, these three classical models on citizenship present a particular 
normative subjectification of individuals as ‘ideal’ citizens, which lies on four 
elements: (a) belonging in a community that creates a common civic 
consciousness and culture; (b) equality in front of the law; (c) collective benefits 
and rights that derive from this status; and (d) the capacity, entitlement and 
obligation for participation in the political, economic and societal processes of the 
community (Bellamy 2008: 598ff; Olsen 2011: 3; Lobeira 2012). Contrasted to 
these traditional discourses of citizenship as congruence between nation, state and 
membership rights, Union citizenship presents a theoretical challenge (Olsen 
2011). 
3.2 Politics and law of Union citizenship 
First of all, questions have been raised about Union citizenship’s legal status, and 
particularly whether it can be called citizenship in the international legal sense of 
the concept or not (Maas 2008: 585). As stated above, citizenship was initially 
linked to the system of sovereign nation-states created with Westphalia. What is 
more, the right of a nation-state to “determine under its own law who are its 
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nationals” in accordance with the “international conventions, international 
custom, and the principles of law regarding nationality and citizenship” was found 
with 1930 Hague Convention
14
. In this sense, since the EU is not a nation-state, it 
should not have the right to determine its own citizens. Actually this discourse 
was promoted in the aftermath of the initial Danish ‘no’ to the ToM referendum, 
which forced the European Council to underline the fact that Union citizenship 
was not designed to replace the national citizenship (Shaw 2010: 20; Olsen 2011: 
5). This explains why the original formulation of Union citizenship is clearly 
dominated by the sovereignty discourse, with access to Union citizenship being 
linked to the ‘nationality principle,’ i.e. it is MS legislation that “settles whether 
an individual possesses the nationality of that particular state” and the conditions 
for acquiring and losing of this nationality (Junevicius 2010: 41), based on the 
principles of jus sanguinis [blood], jus soli [birth] and jus domicili [residence]. 
That is also why Union citizenship was labelled as ‘derivative’ in the literature 
(Olsen 2011: 5). 
Moreover, it has been argued that Union citizenship “did not bring rights 
significantly different to the ones Europeans already enjoyed in their respective 
countries” and “did not open a window of new opportunities for civic 
involvement” (Lobeira 2012: 506). Thus, normatively speaking, Bellamy argued 
that Union citizenship should remain complementary rather than substituting for 
or undermining the national citizenship (2008: 598). As such, it enables 
cooperation between MS, “but not in ways that undermine the sense of belonging 
at the national level” (Bellamy 2008: 603). Similarly, in relation to the three 
models of citizenship discussed previously, it has been argued that the EU ensures 
only the liberal aspect [equality and individual rights] while the republican 
[participatory] and communitarian [solidarity] aspects are ignored (Schall 2012: 
127). 
Another point of discussion was related the issue of the demos, which goes 
beyond the existence of citizenship, as it is linked with a common identity, a 
feeling of belonging and democratic legitimacy. This issue was discussed in the 
case of the EU, and the discourses are contradictory. For instance, some argued an 
EU-wide demos is absent and that this is problematic for the democratic 
legitimacy and the political integration of the EU (Tatranský 2006: 489; Bellamy 
2008: 608). Also, Schall based on evidence from the 2004 Eurobarometer survey 
maintained that “European nationals fail consistently to identify themselves as 
citizens of Europe” (2012: 123), while Tatranský argued that the creation of 
Union citizenship brought about “the enhanced feeling of belonging to Europe 
[which] strengthens identifications of the Europeans at a sub-national level” 
(2006: 491) rather than the supranational. Similarly, as for the democratic 
potential of Union citizenship, based on the decline of the actual feeling of 
belonging to Europe and of the participation of Europeans in the EP elections, 
Tatranský argued that “the EU citizenship policies have so far completely failed 
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both to strengthen the legitimation of EU politics, and to create a sense of closer 
identification of the citizens with Europe” (2006: 502). 
In contrast, some scholars warned against the direct transfer of nation-state 
concepts for the interpretation of EU and Union citizenship, because the classical 
notion of citizenship is in itself “disputed and carries heavy historical and 
intellectual baggage” (Wind 2008: 245), and because both the national 
citizenships and Union citizenship complement each other by creating a 
composite and multi-faceted concept which links the different levels and different 
spheres together, in which “individuals claim citizenship rights, carry out 
citizenship duties and act out citizenship practices” (Shaw 2010: 3). Moreover, as 
Schall explained, some scholars suggested that the formal legal status of Union 
citizenship combined with the supremacy of EU law should be enough to ensure a 
community capable of democracy, while others stated that the common project of 
democracy is sufficient for building a European demos (cf. 2012: 139).  
Especially on the demos issue, Gabel and Andrerson (2001) demonstrated in 
their contribution that the EU mass public organises its attitudes in a systematic 
way within the EU policy space, which would demonstrate the existence of a 
demos. Similarly, Isin and Saward pointed out that “for a European citizenship to 
exist there does not need to be a corresponding demos (or even demoi) since it 
implies and presupposes sovereignty as the foundation of its constitution” (2013: 
7). Finally, as for the existence of a European identity, it has been argued that 
Union citizenship should not be expected to follow the pattern of national identity 
and that there is clearly a non-emotional identity based on “the shared 
consciousness of belonging to an economic and political space defined by 
capitalism, social welfare, liberal democracy, respect for human rights, freedom 
and the rule of law, prosperity and progress” (Guibernau 2011: 31; 40). 
In a similar stance, from a legal point of view the issue is clearer. It suffices to 
say that, contrary to the aforementioned political normative discourses developed, 
the EU here is understood as ‘citizenship capable polity,’ since it displays “the 
types of constitutional features where one might also expect to find some sort of 
concept of membership” (Shaw 2010: 2; Ene and Micu 2013: 57). What matters 
here is black letter law, which can be traced back to the establishment of Union 
citizenship legal status in ToM, and its subsequent development and expansion in 
scope and meaning both by the European Court of Justice [hereinafter the Court] 
case law and most recently with the Treaty of Lisbon [ToL]. As a legal status, 
Union citizenship forms a tripartite legal relationship between the EU, MS and the 
European citizens (Ene and Micu 2013: 55), and is also conceived as the driver of 
the European integration process (cf. Haltern 2004). 
Furthermore, contrary to the aforementioned political discussions, which 
erroneously play out Union citizenship against national citizenship (Rebel 2012: 
53), the legal relationship between the national citizenships and Union citizenship 
is defined as additionality (Ene and Micu 2013: 57), which means that the one 
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does not replace the other but they co-exist as legal statuses
15
. Also, even though 
Union citizenship is linked to MS citizenship/ nationality through the ‘nationality 
principle,’ by itself it confers to European citizens a bundle of new rights that can 
be traced in the Treaties and other legal agreements. Finally, this discourse 
maintains that the MS do not hold the monopoly “regarding the exchange of 
loyalty for rights with their own citizens” anymore (Wind 2008: 242), since 
citizenship establishes the direct legal relationship between the EU and MS 
nationals by empowering them both towards the EU and the national authorities 
(Ene and Micu 2013: 56). 
3.3 Critical counter-discourses 
What we see in the previous section is a struggle between two different readings 
of Union citizenship. To further perplex the analysis, some discourses have been 
presented in relation to the empirical limitations of Union citizenship. These 
critical counter-discourses are focused particularly on the exclusionary and 
limited character of citizenship. As mentioned previously, the liberal model 
introduced a certain difference between citizens and non-citizens. These empirical 
discourses, deeply related to the ‘historico-political’ model of power, come to 
discuss this difference, and especially the exclusionary character of it based on 
gender, sexuality, class, race, ethnicity and religion. As Meer explained, 
citizenship is conceived based on the “dialectical tension between notions of 
inclusion and exclusion,” both between citizens and non-citizens and also between 
different distinctions between citizens (2010: 9). What is more, from this 
perspective we can understand that “either through sovereign decree or everyday 
bureaucratic practice, the rights and freedoms commensurate with citizenship can 
be contingently conferred or removed in different cases,” a core aspect of 
citizenship that is constantly downplayed (Parker and Toke 2013: 361).  
For example, a multiculturalist perspective would start from how Union 
citizenship is supposed to establish a common space with the protection of the 
freedom of movement and the ban of any discrimination based on nationality, 
while at the same time permitting MS to place conditions for the exercise of these 
rights (Parker and Toke 2013: 378). Third country nationals, i.e. both settled 
populations legally residing in EU territory and clandestine immigrants, are 
excluded from the benefits of Union citizenship due to the immigration and 
naturalisation policies and the exclusive status of Union citizenship (Maas 2008: 
583), even though a list of rights and duties relevant them is provided through 
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Union citizenship (Junevicius 2010: 40). The picture is further complicated, as 
discrepancies can be identified between third country nationals as well, since 
bilateral accords between third countries and the EU accords specific rights to 
some third country nationals [e.g. Turkish citizens], while others lack them 
thereof (Maas 2008: 589). Last but not least, it is not only third country nationals 
who are excluded. Parker and Toke, for example, explored the issue of the 
eviction of Romani people from France, who in any instance are considered 
Union citizens (2013: 377). In a similar approach, a particular gender equality 
perspective would focus on how men and women are constructed as differentiated 
citizens (cf. Meier and Lombardo 2008). 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
In this first part of my analytics on Union citizenship, I tried to explore the 
different contradicting discourses and models available. This was done mainly in 
connection to my research question. What can one learn from all these discourses 
on Union citizenship? Do they provide answers for my research question? As 
expected from the discussion in the previous chapter, these discourses and models 
on Union citizenship contradict and oppose each other. But each one of them 
serves as a sumbolon, bringing along one part of the ‘truth,’ and that is why they 
are important for my critical analytics. What one learns here is that the modern 
conceptualisation of citizenship came into existence during the developments of 
Westphalia and the promotion of liberalism, i.e. from the seventeenth up to the 
nineteenth century. This status is directly linked to the sovereignty discourse 
discussed in the previous chapter, and it is connected with particular rights and the 
ideal of equality. Other features of the ‘ideal’ status of citizenship include 
participation, activity, empowerment and identity. What is more, these different 
discourses can be retraced back to the two models on power Foucault discussed 
and challenged. 
Indeed, these conventional discourses explain what Union citizenship is and 
ought to be. But the explanations given are limited in scope and lie on some 
taken-for-granted assumptions. First, citizenship as a status is approached as a 
pre-given entity. For instance, the political approach traces the origins of the 
modern citizenship back to a particular historical period without further exploring 
it. Also, the legal perspective discussed here traces the origins of Union 
citizenship in ToM, without explaining what happened before ToM and also why 
it took so many decades to formulate Union citizenship. What is more, all these 
discourses do not escape the sovereign-centric discourse of power, delimiting, 
therefore, the understanding of Union citizenship in relation to the nation-state. 
Finally, the critical counter-discourses on citizenship, even though they expose a 
fundamental characteristic of citizenship, their account evades the productive 
aspects citizenship can have. A critical analytics of Union citizenship should take 
them all these discourses into consideration, but needs to move beyond their 
limited scope. This is what I will do in the following chapters.  
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4 EU’s liberal governmentalities 
In the previous chapter, I presented the different contradicting discourses and 
knowledges surrounding Union citizenship. As discussed by the end of the 
chapter, these discourses indeed present an explanation of what Union citizenship 
and its central features are. In Foucauldian terms, these discourses should be 
treated as sumbola containing aspects of the ‘truth,’ which my analytics sets to 
recreate. In this second part, I will move on by presenting a genealogy of Europe, 
a history of European integration from Foucauldian standpoint. I will particularly 
focus on the various dominant mentalities of government expressed by different 
actors from the beginning up until the present, and also try to clarify the relation 
of these rationalities with citizenship. Following the presuppositions of a critical 
Foucauldian research design, power/knowledge should not be minimised only at 
the domestic level. As one can see in the rest of the chapter, particular individuals 
and institutions other than state apparatuses had an important role in the European 
project. 
I will the start the discussion by exploring the crucial historical moment when 
modern citizenship was first developed, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
through a Foucauldian reading of the dominant governmentalities developed then 
[section 4.1]. Then I will present the process of the ‘governmentalisation’ of 
Europe from its initial steps [section 4.2], through the major transformations with 
Treaty of Rome [ToR] and ToM [section 4.3], up to the 2000s ‘European 
governance’ transformations [section 4.4]. 
4.1 ‘Governmentalisation’ of the state 
The classical political study of citizenship, as discussed previously [Chapter 3.1], 
explained that the modern conceptualisation of citizenship was formulated in the 
period following the Peace of Westphalia and the rise of liberalism. As mentioned 
already [Chapter 2.1.2], in his studies of the different governmentalities, Foucault 
was particularly interested in the developments that took place from the late 
seventeenth century up until the early twentieth century. During this time many of 
the characteristic institutions and structures of the modern world have been born, 
particularly through a process Foucault called the ‘governmentalisation’ of the 
state. An exploration of his thoughts on the dominant governmentalities related to 
the creation of citizenship would help us retrace aspects of these mentalities later 
on in the case of the EU. 
The Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which established the modern system of 
European sovereign nation-states, and the process of the ‘governmentalisation’ of 
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the state in the eighteenth century marked a break with two dominant rationalities 
of the past: (a) the Christendom discourse expressed in the Augustinian City of 
God, and (b) the rationality of the sovereign Prince expressed in treaties such as 
Machiavelli’s The Prince ([1977] 2001: 201; 204). It introduced a particular 
rationality of the state [raison d’état], a discourse surrounding the ‘national 
interests,’ concerned with the state, its nature, its rationality, its preservation, 
expansion and felicity ([1982] 2001a: 406f). In any case, the Westphalian 
rationality presented a reformulation of the rationality of the sovereign Prince, but 
now power was directed from the preservation of sovereignty per se to the 
exercise of sovereignty for the government of humans ([1977] 1997: 68). The 
priority was to find the ways to strengthen the state and its power as a response to 
the problem of the population (Rose et al. 2006: 84), which as an entity was 
constructed in the mid-eighteenth century based on the idea that humans form 
some kind of a natural collective of living beings. 
Externally the Westphalian system was expressed through a diplomatico-
military technology, which consisted of ensuring, securing and developing the 
forces of the nation-state through a system of alliances/ treaties with other nation-
states and the creation of an army ([1977] 1997: 69). Internally, we can see the 
development of the ‘police’ as the set of the means necessary for making the 
forces of the state increase from within, which was based on certain 
reformulations of past expressions of power/knowledge. The first was the 
secularization of the Christian pastoral power, which introduced the notion of 
‘care’ into government (cf. Dean 2010: 90ff). The central idea of the pastoral 
rationality was to watch over the ‘flock’ on a daily basis for ensuring its salvation 
([1977] 1997: 68). As such, it was introduced in the West with Christianity, and 
the goal of the ‘government of souls’ was to reassure individual salvation in the 
afterlife ([1982] 2001a: 333). And this was achieved through confession and other 
techniques of government
16
, which aimed to produce a certain knowledge/ truth of 
the individual, i.e. of what is inside people’s minds, their souls and innermost 
secrets ([1982] 2001a: 333). 
With the gradual decline of the ecclesiastical power, after the Reformation and 
Counter-reformation movements, this pastoral rationality was secularised, 
spreading and multiplying outside the Church both as an institution and as a 
function ([1977] 1997: 68; [1982] 2001a: 333). The pastoral power of the nation-
state continued to aim for the salvation of the population, but now this was 
defined in ‘worldly’ terms as health, welfare, standard of living, security, and 
protection against accidents ([1982] 2001a: 334). Furthermore, a sort of ‘social’ 
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the aid of knowledge. 
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was formulated, since the exercise of pastoral power was achieved not only by 
state apparatuses but also through private ventures, welfare societies, benefactors 
and philanthropists, and the family ([1982] 2001a: 334). 
The second reformulation was that of biopower, i.e. the power of the Prince 
over the life and death of their subject, which can be traced back to the Roman 
patria potestas concept of the father having power over the life and death of his 
children and slaves ([1976] 1984: 258). With the secularization of pastoral power 
and the introduction of the need to ‘care’ for the population, this right was 
transformed as a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death ([1976] 
1984: 261). This biopower is expressed through biopolitics that are focused on the 
mechanics of life, i.e. the propagation of life, births and mortality, the level of 
health, life expectancy and longevity, and all the conditions that can cause these to 
vary ([1976] 1984: 262). This was achieved through a system of administration, 
control and direction of humans developed, that would enable the nation-state to 
deal with problems such as demography, public health, hygiene, housing 
conditions, and so on ([1976] 2001a: 125). 
These transformations in power/knowledge found expression in the 
apparatus
17
 of the ‘police.’ One should not confuse ‘police’ with the modern use 
of the term. As a scientific discourse and practice, the ‘police’ was developed as a 
‘theory and analysis of everything’ that had to do with increasing the power of the 
state to perform its new pastoral and biopolitical roles, to obtain the welfare of its 
subjects, maintain order and discipline, and govern people as individuals ([1977] 
1997: 70; [1982] 2001a: 410). The welfare of the population was perceived in the 
Westphalian system as an element of the strength of the nation-state, an internal 
requirement for its survival and development ([1982] 2001a: 414). 
Liberalism was developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth century along with 
this gradual ‘governmentalisation’ as a counter-rationality that sought to challenge 
the ‘reason of the state’ and the ‘police’ rationality, and to establish the norms of 
the ‘good’ government (Dean 2010: 133; 144). Foucault approached liberalism, 
not as an ideology, but as an alternative governmentality that which obeys to the 
“internal rule of maximum economy” ([1978] 1997: 73-74). Contrary to the 
‘police’ rationality that “one is not paying enough attention, too many things 
escape one’s control, too many areas lack regulation and supervision” ([1978] 
1997: 74), liberalism reasons that “one always governs too much” and that there 
are other better/less costly means of achieving the same effects ([1978] 1997: 74). 
Most importantly, liberalism has internal varieties, ranging from the more 
classical liberalist practices, the Keynesian welfarism, and the neoliberal varieties.  
Foucault in his courses at Collège de France, was particularly interested in two 
forms of neoliberalism, the German post-war ordoliberalism and the American 
liberalism of the Chicago School that built on ordoliberalism while taking a more 
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 Foucault in his governmentality studies discussed also particular figures of political technologies, which he 
called dispositifs or apparatuses. An apparatus is a “heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements” 
([1977] 1980: 194). 
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radical form (Lemke 2001: 192). A central issue for both of them is the problem 
of welfarism, which was presented in the Keynesian rationality, as an expression 
of pastoralism, sustaining the idea of a big state providing goods and services to 
the population as a way of ensuring social well-being (cf. Larner 2000: 5). Both 
formulations of neoliberalism rejected the rationality of such ‘excessive’ 
government as irrational, and saw social/ welfare governments as generating 
government overload, fiscal crisis, dependency and rigidity (Rose et al. 2009: 91). 
Also, both assumed and essentialised the importance of the market, even though 
they have foundational differences on how market’s operation is to be secured and 
realised (Dean 2010: 187), and also on how they conceptualise the market and 
society and the political solutions they provide (Lemke 2001: 197). 
Ordoliberalism promotes an organisation of the market economy within an 
institutional and juridical framework that offers the guarantees and limitations of 
the law and ensures that the freedom of economy will not create any social 
distortions ([1978] 1997: 78). They support the idea of ‘social market economy’ 
based on a clear distinction between the economic and the social domains, and the 
constant support of the market through political regulations and social 
interventions for housing, unemployment, healthcare and so on (Lemke 2001: 
197). This approach lies on ordoliberalism’s conceptualisation of the market as a 
constructed game of competitive freedom, which is kept alive precisely through 
the active interventions of the liberal state and the organisation of a coherent 
public institutional and legal framework (Lemke 2001: 193; Dean 2010: 184). A 
self-regulating market is seen as a deeply flawed and dangerous idea (Biebricher 
2011: 173). Finally, this rationality presumes the necessity for social policy, 
which instead of being exercised in a negative compensatory function, that is to 
lessen the anti-social consequences of the free market competition, it has to block 
the anti-competitive mechanisms which society generates, through the 
universalization of the entrepreneurial form and the redefinition of law (Lemke 
2001: 195). 
American neoliberalism is a more radical version of neoliberalism. In cites the 
dangers of economic interventionism, but rejects the social market economy of 
ordoliberalism by extending the market rationality to areas that are not primarily 
economic, such as family, birth control, delinquency, penal policy and so on 
([1978] 1997: 79). This extension cancels the distinctions developed with the 
‘governmentalisation’ of the state between the economy and the social sphere as 
the latter is now redefined as a form of the former (Lemke 2001: 197). Also, 
American neoliberalism opposed any kind of state interventionism and criticised 
in the name of economic liberty “the uncontrolled growth of bureaucratic 
apparatuses and the threat to individual rights” (Lemke 2001: 197). The desirable 
kind of freedom now is represented with the absence of state interference 
(Hindess 2001: 97); put differently, American neoliberalism initiated a process of 
‘destatification’ (Joseph 2009: 417). 
In any case, these neoliberal variants of governmentality operated for the 
objectification of the population as ‘ideal’ subjects. Extending the classical 
individualist conceptualisation of citizenship based on individual rights, as 
discussed previously [Chapter 3.1], these neoliberal rationalities promoted the 
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importance of personal conduct in the act of government, i.e. the active and 
participatory aspect of citizenship. The population is now subjectificated as 
naturally endowed with the capacity of autonomous action and as rational 
decision-makers (Hindess 2001: 100; Rose et al. 2006: 84; Cadman 2010: 546). 
What distinguishes (neo)liberalism from other formulations of power/knowledge 
is that government here is precisely achieved through the idea of free conduct, 
self-awareness and self-limitation (Joseph 2009: 416), as individuals are 
encouraged to take charge of their own well-being, to make rational decisions, to 
avoid social problems such as unemployment and poverty, and to become more 
active and responsible (Joseph 2010: 227f). 
As Foucault explained, this perception is established by law, an important 
aspect for liberalism, as it appeared that “regulation through the juridical form 
constituted a far more effective tool than the wisdom or moderation of the 
governors” ([1978] 1997: 76). Two features are identified in particular: the 
development of the rule of law and the discourse of civil and human rights, i.e. the 
‘rights of the governed’ (Dean 2010: 143), and the organisation of a 
‘representative’ parliamentary system, considered to be the most effective system 
of government since they achieve the limitation and control of the participation of 
the governed in the operation of the government through keeping the governed 
divided and away from their governors (Dean 2010: 144). The ‘best’ government 
possible is the one that achieves compatibility between citizens’ rights and 
liberties and the representative institutions allowing the aggregation of the 
citizens’ diverse interests (Dean 2010: 144f). All in all, this reference to 
democracy and rule of law must not be taken as an absolute. As Foucault 
explained, “the democracies of the state of right were not necessarily liberal, nor 
was liberalism necessarily democratic or devoted to the forms of law” ([1978] 
1997: 77). The liberal government of the population, as will be exemplified later 
on in the case of the EU lies on several authoritarian features as well. 
To conclude, the neoliberal point of reference is now homo œconomicus. In 
this formulation, the state has to step back and encourage its citizens to become 
more actively involved in their government and more responsible for their own 
decisions. This is done through the employment of particular ‘technologies of 
government’ that seek to improve or deploy the possibilities of the agency of the 
subjects of government, as a means for their government. Dean identifies two 
broad types, the technologies of agency and performance (2010: 196). The first 
seek to enhance and improve the subjects’ capacities for participation, agreement 
and action while the second seek to make these capacities calculable and 
comparable so that they might be optimised
18
 (Dean 2010: 202). As will be 
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 In order to explain how these technologies are applied in practice, Dean presents the example of how the 
unemployed individual is governed upon their entrance into contract with the government agency – the state or 
otherwise – which promises access to benefits and services. The government agency applies the technologies of 
performance as they demand from the unemployed individual to ‘perform’ their conduct on the freedom given to 
them in a certain way, as active job seekers. As Dean puts it, “the state is constituted by a promise: ‘we will 
assist you to practise your freedom, as long as you practise it our way’” (2010: 188). In the same example, the 
technologies of agency – also called technologies of citizenship – comprise of a multiplicity of techniques of 
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demonstrated in the following sections, these rationalities surrounding 
government and citizenship can be retraced in the EU governmental systems as 
well. 
4.2 Monnet and high modernism 
The expectation would be that the aforementioned governmentalities find 
expression in the case of Europe as well. The idea of the ‘governmentalisation’ of 
Europe was developed at the same historical time of the ‘governmentalisation’ of 
the state, as independent proposals for a ‘united Europe’ first emerged by the end 
of the seventeenth century (Chalmers et al. 2010: 7). But this rationality would 
take concrete formulation only in the early twentieth century. The end of First 
World War came with Coudenhove-Kalergi establishing the pan-European 
movement, which enjoyed considerable support amongst European intellectuals 
and politicians (Chalmers et al. 2010: 7). In 1929, the French foreign minister 
Briand submitted a memorandum for the establishment of a European Federal 
Union that would better govern Europe by promoting the security and by 
protecting sovereignty of the nation-states (Chalmers et al. 2010: 8). The 
catastrophic aftermath of the Second World War aroused greater governmental 
interest in the idea of a united Europe. Following the rationality of Westphalia, 
which was expressed also by Briand, the idea of the united Europe took the 
character of security enforcement, with the establishment of the Western 
European Union in 1948 and the European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC] in 
1950. 
Internally this rationality took a particular high modernist character, under the 
influence of the French diplomat Jean Monnet who is regarded as the chief 
architect of the modern united Europe. His rationality though did not ‘win’ the 
argument without challenge. As stated, there was “no sudden conversion of 
European elites to Jean Monnet’s plans,” since European leaders were torn 
between “competing visions of Europe’s future, each reflecting a particular 
institutional model” (Dehousse and Magnette 2012: 22). But in any case, 
Schuman Declaration of May 1950 and the subsequent signing of the Treaty of 
Paris forming ECSC marked a particular victory of Monnet’s rationality. 
Monnet’s plan for European integration was clearly connected with the ideals of 
the modern and modernisation, something that the early neofunctionalist theories 
of European integration tried to demonstrate (Walters and Haahr 2005b: 21f). 
As an art of government, liberal high modernism came with a particular 
mentality that promoted the faith in scientific and technical progress, associated 
with ambitious large-scale projects and the idea that “the state [is] responsible for 
nothing less than the modernization of society” (Walters and Haahr 2005b: 22). 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
self-esteem, empowerment, consultation and negotiation used for the enhancement of the unemployed subject’s 
labour market skills. 
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The central idea of high modernism is the confidence that scientific and technical 
knowledge can be applied through a central authority on every field of human 
activity, with the expansion of production, the rational design of social order and 
the control over the nature (Walters and Haahr 2005b: 24). Contrary to the 
previous mentalities proposed for the government of Europe as a geopolitical 
power system, this approach sought to create Europe as “a space of industrial and 
social forces that can be calculated, reformed, and modernized” (Walters and 
Haahr 2005b: 23). 
In itself, high modernism brings in mind the eighteenth-century 
governmentality of the ‘police’ as described previously: the rationality that one 
can never govern enough, and thus the government should cover all aspects of 
life, from the management of buildings to the management of human health and 
hygiene. Similar to the police, the main carriers of high modernism are the 
engineers, planners, technocrats, administrators and scientists (Walters and Haahr 
2005b: 26). What is more, the architectural design of ECSC resembles the 
Panopticon apparatus, which as Foucault explained, was first developed by 
Bentham in the eighteenth century as a response to the problem of the economic 
and political costs that came along with the exercise of power and surveillance
19
 
([1977] 1980: 148; 154). Since the nineteenth century, this governmental 
apparatus became generalised, with the state resting on “small-scale, regional, 
dispersed Panoptisisms” ([1976] 1980: 71f), which had more to do with the 
government of the general population and territory, than of criminals and 
vagabonds. 
In Monnet’s plan, this Panopticon is formulated as following: the High 
Authority of ECSC sits at the centre tower overseeing, controlling and regulating 
integration, and those working in the central tower are as few as possible, 
according to Monnet’s idea of government through teams that are small, flexible 
and creative organisations (Walters and Haahr 2005b: 30). Moreover, as a 
response to the problem how should the High Authority govern without 
intervening in the decision-making process (Walters and Haahr 2005b: 30-1), the 
classical Community method of policy-making was developed, defined roughly in 
the late 1960s as a strong role delegated to the European Commission for policy 
design, policy-brokering, policy execution, and managing the interface from 
‘abroad,’ while the Council of Ministers would do the bargaining and package 
deals based on Commission’s plans (Wallace 2012: 91). 
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 The architecture of the Panopticon lies essentially on a centre and a perimeter ([1977] 1980: 147). At the 
periphery one can find the cells containing those who are governed, and at the centre one finds a tower with large 
windows opened towards the perimeter, where the supervisor or overseer stands, with a clear vision of the cells, 
which are perfectly individualised and constantly visible ([1975] 1995: 200). The Panopticon perfects the 
exercise of power in several ways. It reduces the number of those who exercise it, while increasing the number 
of those on whom it is exercised, it can intervene at any moment, which does not happen every time ([1975] 
1995: 206). Furthermore, for control and surveillance, it only involves the inspecting gaze, which each individual 
ends up interiorising to the point that they become their own overseers, exercising surveillance and controlling 
over and against themselves ([1977] 1980: 155) and others, as a state of conscious and permanent visibility. This 
assures the automatic functioning of the controlling and normalising power, even when the actual overseer might 
not be present, at all ([1975] 1995: 201). 
 25 
 
To conclude, Monnet’s high modernistic plan for Europe did not provide for 
citizens. There is a particular elitist aspect in such projects, non-excluding the case 
of Europe. As stated above, the centre of the modernisation universe is a group of 
people distinguished by its technocratic character, and without any need for 
democratic legitimacy. Monnet assumed that a ‘permissive consensus’ existed 
among the citizens of the nation-states for the European project, and maintained 
that European integration was not to be achieved through explicitly political 
approaches, but behind the people’s back, as a gradual result of elite negotiations, 
interest group pressures, far away from the population (Walters and Haahr 2005b: 
27). Therefore, this first instance of European government was interested in 
imagining and governing Europe, not of the European populations. This came 
with the developments that followed. 
4.3 Governing through freedom and citizenship 
Following Monnet’s high modernist aspirations, Europe was initially engineered 
in a top-down fashion. Liberalism was an important aspect of this 
governmentality, expressed particularly through the panoptical apparatus. This 
European government was transformed in several instances through the decades, 
which can be read as a contingent succession of events. The first came with the 
foundation of the European Economic Community [EEC] with ToR in 1958, 
which initiated the common market project. This expanded on the high 
modernistic aspiration of the past, as ToR can be read as a programmatic 
reflection of the possibility for a governmentable European market space (Walters 
and Haahr 2005b: 42). The ordoliberal rationality, as described previously, was an 
important aspect in the development of the internal market (Chalmers et al. 2010: 
677), and particularly the idea that the market as a space can be constructed with 
the correct regulations from a central authority. Ordoliberalism, of course, should 
not be confused with the essence or the logic of the European Community, but it 
can help understand the form of liberalism underlying the ToR development 
(Walters and Haahr 2005b: 53).  
Following this neoliberal rationality, ToR invoked ‘freedom’ as the means for 
completing the common market. Freedom here was expressed in negative 
neoliberal terms as the abolition of any obstacles to the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital. Building on these precepts, even though there is no 
special provision for citizens in the ToR system, we can now see the first instance 
of subjectification of the European population as homines œoconomici, with the 
establishment of certain rights for the workers, the producers, the farmers and so 
on. The freedoms provided in ToR are not a universal or abstract right, but “a 
technology for the achievement of specific governmental objectives, such as 
stability, development, and rising standards of living” (Walters and Haahr 2005b: 
45). All rights given are market-related, including, for example, the right of 
movement, establishment, equal wage for equal job, and so on. Therefore, the 
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well-being of people combined with the liberal ‘freedom’ was formulated based 
on a certain pastoralism that aims at the achievement of the common market. 
To reiterate, no centralised citizenship status or a system of fundamental rights 
and protection of them were initially established. The dominant governmentality 
was that expressed through the nation-states, regulating their populations, in a 
fashion described already in the previous section. For the European level, if any 
concerns did arise, the MS where required to guarantee the protection of these 
rights through their national constitutions, and the early case law of the Court 
reflects exactly this mentality (Chalmers et al. 2010: 232). But a crisis in this 
model of government came along with the developments of the Community law in 
the 1960s and the Court’s activism. First in Van Gend en Loos20, the Court 
proposed a certain supranational view of Community law, claiming the legal 
power and authority in Europe based on the Treaty towards which MS have to 
adapt as sub-units, and also that the developments with European integration 
created a political community in Europe for the benefit of its subjects, be they 
MS, citizens, and so on (Chalmers et al. 2010: 15). This new rationality was 
reinforced in the consequent Costa
21
 ruling, in which the Court acting really 
radically reclaimed Community law’s sovereignty22 and autonomy (Chalmers et 
al. 2010: 187). 
Thus, two conflicting mentalities can be identified here, expressed in the form 
of a struggle for sovereignty: (a) the classical form of sovereignty of nation-states 
and (c) the new supremacy rationality of Community law
23
. More importantly, 
this new rationality created a certain lacuna of protection, and towards the end of 
the 1960s, the Court acted proactively with Van Eick
24
 and Stauder
25
, by 
recognising a particular obligation on behalf of the Community institutions’ staff 
to observe fundamental principles of law. However, national courts were left with 
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 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingdienst [1963] ECR 1. 
21
 Case 6/64 Costa v Enel [1964] ECR 585. 
22
 The particular rationality promoted by the Court here can be understood as the adaptation of a certain 
‘philosophico-juridical’ discourse on power-sovereignty. Though, I am not interested in exploring this point any 
further. 
23
 In foucauldian terms, the relation between these two counter rationalities was expressed as a continuous 
struggles and provocation. This can be demonstrated with the case of Italy. Initially the Italian courts denied the 
rationality, with the Italian Constitutional Court holding that in the case of a clash between two norms, the one 
which is later in time should take precedence, which prompted the Court to give its Costa ruling. In the 1970s 
the Italian Constitutional Court modified its position, accepting the primacy of Community law none 
withstanding the cases of protection of the inalienable human rights promoted and protected by the Italian 
constitution (Chalmers et al. 2010: 234). See Frontini v Ministero delle Finanze [1974] 2 CMLR 372. The 
struggle between the Italian courts and the Court continued until recently. See for instance C-106/77 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629; SpA Granital v Amministrazione 
delle Finanze, Dec 170 of 8 June 1984 (1984); Spa Fragd v Amministrazione delle Finanze, Dec 232 of 21 Apr 
1989 (1989); Admenta et alia v Federfarma et alia [2006] 2 CMLR 47. A similar reaction was made by the 
German Constitutional Court, which rejected the Court’s claim of sovereignty up until 1986, when with Solange 
II case [Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft, BVerfG decision of 22 October 1986 [1987] 225], claimed that the 
protection of fundamental rights granted at the European level reached a similar level to the protection granted 
by the German Basic Law, and thus as long as that was the case, the German Constitutional Court would have 
no restrictions to accept Community law primacy (cf. Chalmers et al. 2010: 235). 
24
 Case 35/67 Van Eick v Commission [1968] ECR 329. 
25
 Case 29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419. 
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the choice of refusing to apply Community law and to neglect fundamental 
liberties enshrined in their national constitutions (Chalmers et al. 2010: 233). 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
26
 was the first time when fundamental rights 
became an integral part of the Community law to be enforced (Chalmers et al. 
2010: 234). This was a turning point that led to the expansion of the ‘rights of the 
governed’ from market-related to more universal. 
From 1970s onwards, following the Nold
27
 ruling, we see the Court starting to 
recognise human rights for the European subjects based on international human 
rights treaties
28
. Partly the result of a particular need developed in the aftermath of 
ToR, this new rationality came to challenge completely the elitist nature of high 
modernism, and reinforce the liberal mentality established with ToR on governing 
through freedom. The next crucial event took place with 1992 ToM, which 
created the EU, promoted the completion of the common market, and established 
the present European governmental regime
29
. Above I referred to ordoliberalism 
as the rationality behind ToR and the common market project. Nevertheless, other 
rationalities and identities are at word as well (Walters and Haahr 2005b: 63), thus 
it is more efficient to refer to the European governmentality as ‘advanced 
liberalism’30. For instance, the 1980s saw a general reintroduction of the 
American neoliberal rationality, which found expression in the European 
governmental regime as well, and as it has been argued, the adoption of the 
neoliberal agenda in the 1980s was what gave the opportunity for the Community 
to formulate and envision a certain citizenship idea for the EU, based in the 
neoliberal ideals of the individualised market and consumer citizenship (Hansen 
2000: 141) 
Of course, as an idea, Union citizenship existed in the official discourse since 
the early 1970s (Hansen 2000: 142; Tatranský 2006: 502), apparently developed 
in parallel with the Court’s new rationality of sovereignty and rights. So, one 
question begging is why this was achieved now? Various aspects can be 
highlighted. Up until the end of the 1980s, the European integration project was 
immobilized by an economic crisis, and the previous set of rules made decision-
making almost impossible, a time remembered as Eurosclerosis (Peterson and 
Shackleton 2012: 2). Also, the lack of democratic legitimacy imposed a heavy 
burden on the common market project. ToM with the establishment of EU in 
general, and the development of a fuller conception of Union citizenship, in 
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 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1970] ECR 112. 
27
 Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491. 
28
 For a list of cases in which the Court identified international treaties as sources of fundamental rights see 
Chalmers et al. 2010: 235f, footnotes 15-44. 
29
 As we will see later on, this governmentality was reformed in the 2000s. However, I make a totalising claim 
here, since officially up until now the EU system is based on the reforms of the Treaty of the EU [hereinafter 
TEU] first established with ToM. 
30
 This distinction was made, among others, by Dean who understands ‘advanced liberalism’ as “the broader 
realm of the various assemblages of rationalities, technologies and agencies that constitute the characteristic 
ways of governing in contemporary liberal democracies” (2010: 176), which indicates the coexistence of a 
multiplicity of governmentalities and a variety of liberalisms. 
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particular, came as a solution to this crisis
31
. Furthermore, this development can 
be understood as a means towards the norm of ‘good’ government, since Union 
citizenship could help better govern Europe, through various technologies of 
government Here we can identify one particular technology of government, that of 
differentiation (Walters and Haahr 2005b: 73). 
This technology of differentiation is a central aspect of liberal rationality of 
government and the liberal conceptualisation of citizenship. As Hindess (2000; 
2001) explained, citizenship is used for the management of the global population 
by dividing it into subpopulations consisting of citizens. This is based on (a) the 
individual freedom of some parts of the population and (b) the individual 
unfreedom of others that should be restrained and excluded as an important step 
for the maintenance and defence of individual liberties (Hindess 2001: 94). The 
same applies for Union citizenship as well. ToM established the EU above all as a 
political project, and Union citizenship as a category was needed first and 
foremost for the differentiation between the Union citizens that are to be governed 
through freedom, and those to be governed by unfreedom. Based on this, it is 
made possible to differentiate between three categories of individuals: (a) the 
citizens holding full formal citizenship, (b) the denizens residing in one country, 
but holding a bounded citizenship, (c) the aliens who hold full citizenship in other 
nation-states, and (d) the illegals
32
 (cf. van Houdt 2008: 8). 
Another liberal principle of government developed parallel to citizenship was 
that of the fundamental rights promoted by the Court. Two attempts made for the 
development of this principle, first in 1979 with Commission’s proposal for 
accession to the European Convention of Human Rights [hereinafter ECHR] and 
second in 1989 with a comprehensive catalogue of fundamental rights formulated 
by the European Parliament, failed (Krüger 2004: xvii), because, as I would 
personally argue, an important vehicle for these rights, i.e. Union citizenship, was 
missing. Nonetheless, after its introduction with ToM, we see a very hesitant and 
gradual development towards this direction. In several cases, the Court had a 
chance to reclaim the identity of Union citizenship as such a vehicle of 
fundamental rights, but they initially avoided it
33
. It was not until the end of the 
1990s when the Court indicated in Martínez Sala34 how powerful Union 
citizenship might be, as it can provide for a basis for bringing a person within the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
31
 One should keep in mind how classical political theory connects citizenship with democratic legitimacy. 
32
 The category of denizens could include Roma people in the EU, and the category of aliens includes the non-
European citizens migrating to Europe. This technology of differentiation brings also in mind the critical 
discourses developed challenging Union citizens as exclusionary category [see Chapter 3.3]. 
33
 See for instance Case C-168/91 Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig, Standesamt und Landratsamt Calw – 
Ordnungsamt [1993] ECR I-1191. This case serves as a paradigmatic case because, even though the Advocate-
General to the case saw a perfect opportunity for Konstantinidis to reclaim his status as Union citizens, and thus 
invoke the protection against the violation of his fundamental rights, the Court decided to rule not on the basis of 
Union citizenship and human rights, but based on the economic freedom of establishment and non-
discrimination (Haltern 2004: 190f). 
34
 Case C-85/96 Martínez  Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691. The fundamental position of Union 
citizenship was expanded fully with Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-
Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193. 
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material scope of the Treaties, and entitles them to equality of treatment (White 
2004: 313-4). This liberal mentality of government through freedom and rights 
took a complete expression in the ‘European governance’ developed in the 2000s. 
4.4 ‘European governance’ 
The European governmental regime took another turn in the early 2000s, as the 
result of a crisis of legitimacy initiated with the negative referenda in Denmark, 
Ireland and Sweden, and the resignation of Santer’s Commission in 1999 
following an intense criticism from the EP. The Prodi Commission took up the 
task to reform the European governmental system. Three developments can be 
identified in particular: (a) the introduction of ‘European governance’ regime, (b) 
the adoption of the Open Method of Coordination [OMC] as a break from the past 
high modernist Community method, and (c) the expansion of Union citizenship 
with the development of the fundamental rights concept. 
The 2000 Green Paper for the future of parliamentary democracy and the 2001 
White Paper on Governance were the expression of a new rationality well 
prepared in the previous decade, which proclaimed the reform of European 
governmentality based on the concept of ‘governance.’ As a term, ‘governance’ 
was predominantly used up until the seventeenth century, when it was replaced by 
‘government.’ It reappeared in the 1990s among international organisations and 
social scientists, as a particular form of coordination between organisations based 
on networks and partnerships rather than hierarchies (Shore 2011: 294). In the 
case of the EU, the concept ‘government’ was used in a period of general 
optimism about the European integration project, with the European Commission 
being understood as the kernel of a ‘European government’ (Shore 2011: 290). 
With the crisis of the late 1990s, this new discourse of ‘governance’ focusing on 
decentralisation, subsidiarity and voluntary action, appealed to EU policy makers, 
with many believing that it offers a better paradigm for understanding how the EU 
works (Shore 2011: 295). 
The new governmentality of ‘European governance’ aimed at making the 
decision-making processes more transparent and less top-down, more inclusive 
and accountable, and also the EU policies more effective (Shore 2011: 291). An 
important aspect of the success of ‘European governance’ mentality is that served 
as a self-fulfilling prophesy. What I mean is that, on the one hand, the 
Commission came to define it and gradually established it through techniques and 
practices needed for its exercise, and, on the other hand, it achieved making it the 
acceptable explanation of how the EU works. The latter can be found in the 
growing literature on ‘multi-level governance,’ which theorises EU governance as 
non-hierarchical, both formal and informal, based on deliberation, dialogue and 
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problems solving, with policy-making through networks and coalitions, and 
proves through research that this is ‘truly’ how the EU functions35. 
In any case, ‘European governance’ is the expansion of the advanced liberal 
government of Europe established first with ToR and promoted with ToM. What 
changed now is that the EU breaks with the particular pastoral and police 
rationalities of high modernism, and enhances fully the liberal rationality of ‘good 
government’ discussed previously, summarised as “govern as less as possible and 
let the subjects govern themselves.” The agent of government now is 
predominantly the EU level, and particularly the Commission, the Court and the 
different agencies established under the Commission, while the subjects of 
government are both the MS and the Union citizens. The new rationality 
comprises an assemblage “of norms guiding the exercise of Union power,” 
including openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, coherence, 
subsidiarity and proportionality (Chalmers et al. 2010: 350). Boiling them down, 
we can identify three technologies of government: transparison, performance and 
agency. Each of them is distinct but deeply related to the rest. As Walters and 
Haahr explained, the EU looked to such technologies as a means for enhancing its 
democratic profile (2005b: 77). 
The technology of transparison has to do with the mode EU should govern. 
This relates mainly on three principles promoted in the 2001 White Paper on 
Governance: subsidiarity, proportionality and transparency. The first two are 
important general principles for EU law, as they find expression in the Treaties 
and clarify when and how the EU can intervene. Subsidiarity promotes the 
rationality of self-government, where decisions should be made as local as 
possible, while proportionality exemplifies the quality of the EU intervention that 
is how intrusive EU should be in its interventions (Chalmers et al. 2010: 362). The 
third, the transparency principle, was first discussed in ToM (Walters and Haahr 
2005b: 74), and found expression in the ‘European governance’ regime. 
Officially, it is centred in the need for accountability (Chalmers et al. 2010: 384), 
but from a governmentality point of view, it serves to construct a space in Europe 
where the subjects of government are well-informed, well-established and can 
participate in the consultation that takes place before any legislative action (cf. 
Chalmers et al. 2010: 373). Last but not least, the White Paper on European 
governance calls for a strengthening of involvement, facilitation of the 
participation of local and regional governments, the civil society and citizens in 
the decision-making process (Walters and Haahr 2005b: 76). This relates to the 
other two technologies of government, performance and agency. This is deeply 
related to Union citizenship and the fundamental rights principle, which were 
further developed in this particular advanced liberal governmentality. 
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 See for instance, Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Kock 2004, Peterson 2004, Jönsson and Strömvik 2005. From a 
foucauldian perspective, several scholars examined the similarities between governance approach and 
governmentality, and emphasised the fact that governance is indeed a governmentality, and that  Foucauldian 
analytics of government can clarify how it is used for the government of Europe (cf. Lemke 2007; Merlingen 
2011). 
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4.5 Concluding remarks 
For clarity, I decided to stop the discussion of how the new ‘European 
governance’ mentality is expressed in practice through Union citizenship. I will 
focus particularly on this point in the next and final part of my analytics. All in all, 
what I tried to do in this chapter was to take what we learn from the discourses on 
Union citizenship [Chapter 3] one step further. I first discussed the dominant 
mentalities of government available in the process related to the 
‘governmentalisation’ of the state, as they are directly linked to the modern 
formulation of citizenship. Then I moved on with a genealogy of the different 
liberal governmentalities related to the ‘governmentalisation’ of Europe, and tried 
tracing the emergence, formation, and lineage of Union citizenship, and the 
rationalities it served. 
We learn several things from this genealogy of EU governmentalities. 
Initially, the elitist mentality of liberal high modernism guiding ECSC excluded 
citizens from the picture. This rationality was gradually dismissed with the 
development of EEC and the construction of subjects in market-related terms. At 
this moment, the national sovereign intergovernmental discourse persisted as the 
protection of European population was left to MS. However, through the Court’s 
activist reclamation of sovereignty, a new rationality was gradually formulated 
that had to do with the liberal mentality of governing through freedom and rights. 
This found clear expression in ToM with the establishment of Union citizenship, a 
move much needed among others to reverse the period of Eurosclerosis. But still, 
it took up to the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the formulation of a new 
governmentality of ‘European governance,’ for this liberal mentality of governing 
through freedom and rights to get clear expression. 
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5 Union Citizenship and Rights 
In the previous chapter I explored the genealogy of the various governmentalities 
forming Europe, and their relation with citizenship. I reached the point of the late 
1990s and early 2000s with the introduction of ‘European governance,’ best 
understood as an attempt to perfect the advanced liberal government of EU. This 
governmentality finds clear expression in Union citizenship, and the latter 
becomes a mechanism for governing EU through the subjectification of its 
subjects. As mentioned already, the new governmentality of ‘European 
governance’ precludes a reach out and democratic engagement with the public. 
This is done through the enhancement of the ‘practices of liberty’ that both 
depend on and shape the subjects. For the system to function accordingly, it needs 
the reconstruction of Union citizens in a suitable way, i.e. a certain 
subjectification that would help them respond as participators in their government. 
This was made possible with the development of the fundamental rights discourse 
and of the EU law defining the citizenship and fundamental rights of the Union 
subjects, and also through regulatory agencies. 
What I expect to find are individuals to be constructed/ normalised, through 
various technologies of citizenship
36
 and performance, as active and conscious 
citizens able to self-manage themselves and control their own risk (Haahr 2004: 
218; Walters and Haahr 2005b: 123; Dean 2010: 196). This is what I will try to 
demonstrate in this third part of my analytics. Following the Foucauldian 
assumptions presented in Chapter 2 on the subjectification and subjectivation of 
individuals, the discussion will be done in two parts. First, I will explore how the 
EU constructs the identity of ‘idea’ Union citizenship through law [section 5.2] 
and how this identity is enacted in practice through the different agencies 
developed under the Commission [section 5.3]. Then I will examine the 
potentialities available for individuals to subjectivate themselves differently and 
even express political dissent towards the way they are governed [section 5.4]. 
The chapter will conclude with recent developments that potentially could serve 
as a transformation in European governmentality in the future [section 5.5]. 
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 Cruikshank used this particular formulation to describe technologies of agency in the case of citizens. These 
consist of multiple techniques “employed for the purpose of empowerment and involvement of specific groups 
or individuals in consultation and negotiation” (Haahr 2004: 217). 
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5.1 Foucauldian perspectives on law 
In this point, before moving on with the actual discussion, I need to make some 
clarifications on the position of law in an analytics of power and government. As 
stated above, I want to explore how Union citizens are defined through law, as 
part of the ways the EU subjectificates/ normalises them. Since several 
misunderstandings can be found in the literature concerning Foucault’s position 
towards law (cf. Rose and Valverde 1998: 542), the question begging is 
methodological at its core: can I use the law in order to see how the different 
technologies of government apply in reality? Or as Rose and Valverde asked, 
have the instruments of law become integrated into technologies for the 
government of life (1998: 541)? The answer comes with an explanation of how to 
approach law. 
Previously [Chapter 3.2], when I discussed the different discourses of Union 
citizenship, I challenged the legal discourses on Union citizenship because they 
are referring to a philosophico-juridical discourse of power, which limits the 
analysis per se. Most particularly, such perspectives see law as black letters, as a 
given fact. From a Foucauldian standpoint, though, law is best understood as the 
result of the struggle between ‘subjugated knowledges.’ Rules, norms and laws 
developed are not the outcome of a well-calculated process, but the reflection of a 
victorious discourse over others. As Foucault put it, the successes of history 
belong to those who are capable of bending these rules, norms and laws, invert 
their meaning and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them 
([1971] 1998: 378). The same applies in EU. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the Court came to develop contrary to the initial intergovernmental and high 
modernist rationalities, a mentality of EU law sovereignty and a liberal rationality 
of governing the population through rights, which initially found reactions among 
MS, and had to win the ‘struggle’ and become an acceptable rationality. 
What is more, under liberalism law finds a new expression, no longer as an 
instrument of sovereignty but as a component of the liberal technology of 
government (Dean 2010: 133). I have already discussed the core essence of 
liberalism that governs through ‘freedom,’ and this freedom is established through 
law. However, as mentioned earlier, the rule of law and representative democracy 
were never liberal neither by virtue nor by nature (Dean 2010: 142f), even though 
they have been used serving the rationality of liberalism. After all, with the 
technology of differentiation in liberalism the government of the population as 
citizens lies on the authoritative government of the non-citizens as unfree. Law in 
liberalism becomes an instrument for the exercise of power, linked to a complex 
assemblage of disciplinary and governmental apparatuses (Dean 2010: 140). 
Also, contrary to the conventional classical philosophical understanding of 
law and rights deriving from human nature or God – see, for example, the social 
contract conceptualisations, law now derives from “the characteristics or attributes 
of the things, activities, facts or populations to which it is to be applied” (Dean 
2010: 142). Following Foucault, rights are models proposed, suggested and 
imposed on an individual by their culture, society and social group (Sokhi-Bulley 
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2013: 233), as a means of subjectification. Most importantly, law is understood as 
a complex and partial instrument of power, which can be found in a number of 
non-juridical mechanisms as well ([1977] 1980: 141). This complexity refers 
particularly to “the assemblage of legal practices, legal institutions, statutes, legal 
codes, authorities, discourses, texts, norms and forms of judgement” (Rose and 
Valverde 1998: 542). 
To sum, a genealogical approach to law should not seek to unify it. The fiction 
for a ‘Law’ as a unified phenomenon is the creation of legal textbooks that bring 
together and rationalise the diversity of legal sites, concepts, criteria of judgment, 
discourses, objects and objectives (Rose and Valverde 1998: 545). What is needed 
for an analytics of government based on law is to take an alternative route by 
examining what law governs, that is how law emerges parallel and as a response 
to problems/ crisis of government. In particular we should focus on how law is 
used for subjectifications, normalisations, spatialisations and authorisations (Rose 
and Valverde 1998: 547). Such an analysis will be attempted in the following 
section. 
5.2 Subjectification through freedom/ agency 
So how is the government of the population managed through law? As discussed 
already [Chapter 4.4], the ‘European governance’ governmentality presupposes a 
reach out and engagement of the public as active and free participators. The 
rationality of advanced liberalism is to govern through ways which seek to “elicit 
agency, enhance performance, celebrate excellence, promote enterprise, foster 
competition and harness its energies” (Walters and Haahr 2005b: 119), that is 
through the employment of the technologies of citizenship/ agency and 
performance. This is done through the mobilisation of the freedoms of its subjects. 
Thus, what is needed is an advanced formulation of citizenship rights. The past 
decades served as the basis of this rationality, which could only be fully employed 
with the ‘European governance’ regime. The law37 formed the basis of this 
rationality. 
Starting from the general, in a formulation introduced with the current ToL, 
Article 2 TEU presents the general values of the EU: respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and respect for human rights, pluralism, 
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality of sexes. This 
reflects the ‘ideal’ construction of Europe, as imagined with ‘European 
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 The legal discussion here will be based on the consolidated versions of the Treaties, resulting from the most 
recent reforms with the Treaty of Lisbon. This should not be considered as an attempt to produce a unified 
version of law. As will be demonstrated the developments presented here are far from continuous. My argument 
would be that what is contained in the Treaties now reflects the discourses developed within the ‘European 
governance’ governmentality up until the present, but this is not the end product in any way. Whenever an article 
in the Treaties replaced a previous article, or whenever the reference is made to a previous formulation of the 
Treaties, this is clarified in the text. 
 35 
 
governance.’ The Treaties provide for these advanced liberal values. In particular, 
Article 6 TEU introduced before ToL, sets out the rules governing the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights developed back in 2000. What is more, Article 9 TEU 
establishes Union citizenship after repealing Article 8 introduced first with ToM, 
and Articles 18-25 TEU reiterate the previous formulations on Union citizenship, 
and the rights to be given as such. Mainly these two references demonstrate how 
Union citizens are imagined, even though reference to particular rights can be 
found in other legislative acts and the Court’s case law38. 
In any case, by examining what rights are provided for Union citizens in the 
Treaties and the Charter, we can understand how Union citizens are imagined to 
fit the ‘ideal’ imaginary of Europe. What we can identify in general are civil 
rights, rights of defence, economic rights and also the general principles of non-
discrimination, legal certainty and proportionality (Chalmers et al. 2010: 229), 
and also particular exceptions which pose limits to the ‘ideal’ category of Union 
citizens. As for the particular rights of Union citizens, these include the right to 
move and reside throughout the EU [Article 21 TEU] and the right of non-
discrimination [Article 18 TEU], rights to engage fully and equally in the 
common affairs of the political community, expressed through the right to vote, to 
hold office and to hold office holders accountable [Articles 20, 22, 24 TEU], the 
right for consular protection [Article 23], and even the right of initiative for 
inviting the Commission to submit a legislative proposal [Article 11 TEU]. It has 
been argued that at the heart of Union citizenship is migration, which means that 
the rights provided to Union citizens are acquired only outside the citizen’s state 
of origin (Guild 2004: 232). Here an important aspect of Union citizenship is 
brought in the picture: the cross-boundary element. These elements demonstrated, 
for example, in the free movement of people within the EU
39
 and the right to vote 
and stand as a candidate for the EP and municipal election, the right to consular 
protection
40
 and the right to complaint (cf. Guild 2004: 245). The precondition is 
for the population is to be economically active or independent (Chalmers et al. 
2010: 440) in order to fall into the ‘ideal’ category of Union citizens and thus 
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 For instance, Article 19 TEU [ex 13 TEC] allows the Council to regulate unanimously and in special 
legislative procedure discriminations on grounds of sex, gender, race, ethnic origin, religion or belief, sexual 
orientation, age and disability – notwithstanding several limitations (cf. Chalmers et al. 2010: 536). Based on this 
legal basis the EU was able to expand Union citizenship rights with the development of EU opportunities law 
and the provisions of a certain number of Directives. See for example Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the 
principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22; Directive 
2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ 
L303/16; and Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal 
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation [2006] OJ L204/23. 
39
 The right/ freedom of movement is established further with Directive 2004/38/EC on the rights of citizens of 
the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] 
OJ L158/77. 
40
 Particularly here, the Decision 95/553/EC on the practical arrangements for implementing Article 23 TEU, 
thus regulating when assistance, relief, repatriation or financial aid is provided, further limits the scope of the 
right, as it makes it applicable only in the case when there is no consular representation of a MS. For instance, a 
citizen in trouble has no right for consular protection from another MS if their state has even one diplomat 
somewhere in the same country, even kilometres away from them (Chalmers et al. 2010: 483). 
 36 
 
reclaim the rights deriving from this status. We can, thus, conclude that the liberal 
rationality connecting citizenship with the creation of the common market, 
initiated in the previous periods, is still present within the new governmentality of 
‘European governance.’ 
In the case of the Charter, the rights contained are mainly those that the Court 
recognised in the previous decades based on all various sources (Chalmers et al. 
2010: 236). Thus, this document can be read as the victory of the governmentality 
developed by the Court. Officially the Charter emerged based on two impulses by 
the end of the 1990s and early 2000s: (a) the desire to give social rights the same 
status as other rights such as civil liberties – after all the ‘European governance’ 
mentality was expressed also through the Lisbon Strategy for social Europe, and 
(b) the consensus that fundamental rights in EU law should be more visible – part 
of the technology of transparison discussed previously (cf. Chalmers et al. 2010: 
237). It has been argued that the ECHR is already “a Bill of Rights for the whole 
of Europe,” which the Court has already used as a source of law (Krüger 2004: 
xxi). So the question begging is what reasons does a unified Charter serve? The 
1999 Cologne European Council decided to elaborate a Charter of fundamental 
rights that would be “an amalgam of rights,” including civil and political rights 
contained in the ECHR, the constitutional traditions common to the MS, the 
Union citizenship provisions, the social, economic and cultural rights similar to 
the European Social Charter and the Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers, and also Union citizens’ particular rights (Krüger 2004: 
xviii; Chalmers et al. 2010: 237). Put simply, the European Council wanted to 
institutionalise the practice of the Court of the previous decades. 
Most importantly, the Charter “considers humans need for a good life” 
(Chalmers et al. 2010: 239). What we can find in the Charter is how the ‘ideal’ life 
of the Union citizens should look like. This re-establishes a sort of pastoralism on 
behalf of the EU, as if they are saying: “we want to take care for your well-being, 
we are providing you ‘good life,’ and this is how we define it.” Following this 
thought, it is important to see what is included and what is excluded from the 
Charter. The Charter contains 54 Articles divided into chapters. The first chapter 
on ‘Dignity’ serves as the raison d’ être for all human and fundamental rights (cf. 
Krüger 2004: xvii). The rest of the chapters include provisions on Freedom, 
Equality, Solidarity, Citizens’ Rights, Justice, and also the General Provisions 
regulating the application of the Charter. The Charter is deeply connected to 
Union citizenship. As Krüger explains, the protection extends only to those who 
are Union citizens, which are referred to as ‘every person’ in general and 
particular groups in particular (2004: xix). Some of these rights are absolute, but 
many fall under the exceptions provided in Articles 52-54 of the Charter. 
Furthermore, the Charter comes with an interpretation clause – the mentality 
explaining the rights.  
As Chalmers et al. explain, the “EU fundamental rights law is to be interpreted 
according to an autonomous reasoning with the meaning of particular rights 
determined in the light of broader Union objectives (2010: 241) focused mainly 
on non-violation of the protection provided by other treaties or national 
constitutions, on the restriction of judicial creativity, and on the harmonious 
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interpretation of the rights provided in alignment with other sources of rights 
(Chalmers et al. 2010: 242-6), and in particular with potential limitations of 
specific substantive rights
41
. And here lies an important challenge: the Court 
should be referring to the national constitutional traditions for the interpretation of 
the rights, but the national constitutional traditions are not codified into a single 
legal instrument, while the difference that exists in terminology, interpretation and 
hierarchy of rights and values in particular countries makes the issue even more 
difficult. Therefore, with the Charter as it is right now, one cannot talk of a 
baseline of protection (Chalmers et al. 2010: 246). In several cases, the Court 
surrendered to national principles and rules of law, which subsequently overruled 
freedoms provided by EU law
42
. 
Following the advanced liberal mentality of openness and freedom, the 
Charter was decided to be developed in the method of Convention with the 
participation of all interested parts, including representatives of MS, the European 
and the national parliaments, the Commission, the Court, the Council of Europe, 
and so on. This was called “wise decision” as it ensured constructive collaboration 
(Krüger 2004: xvii). The text of the Charter was officially proclaimed in the 2000 
European Council Nice summit, which served as a “political commitment to a 
deeper and wider debate on future development of the EU” (de Búrca and 
Aschenbrenner 2004: 4f). This period saw, also, the initiation of a wider public 
debate for the Constitutional Treaty for Europe. So, we can understand the 
development of the Charter as one step towards the constitutionalisation of 
Europe, the other being the introduction of the ‘European governance’ 
governmentality with Commission’s White Paper in 2001. However, the openness 
rationality kept the legal status of the Charter not clearly defined in the beginning, 
something which also meant that a wider array of rights could have been included 
as well (Chalmers et al. 2010: 238). 
Also, the Charter can be seen as is part of a greater legal pluralism of rights 
(cf. Chalmers et al. 2010: 228-9). For example, as McGoldrick mentions, up to 
1994 only, the UN compilation of International Human Rights Instruments 
contained 95 instruments, and ever since a great number of instruments have been 
adopted (McGoldrick 2004: 83). So how is the Charter positioned in relation to 
the UN context of fundamental rights? In his contribution, McGoldrick examined 
a series of issues in respect to this relation (cf. 2004: 121). What would be of 
interest here is to see examples of what rights are included and excluded from the 
Charter in relation to the once provided from the UN (McGoldrick 2004: 109-
119). In several cases rights are provided with no equivalent in the UN context
43
, 
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 For the list of the specific rights to be limited see Peers 2004, pp. 152-4. 
42
 See for instance Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatensaufstellungs v Oberbürgermeinsterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609. In this case the Court voidly referred to the right to human dignity 
preserved by the German Basic Law and ruled against the freedom of the firm Omega to sell a laser-gun game. 
As Chalmers et al. argue, in the Court’s ruling, “the substance of its vision on human dignity is completely 
empty” (2010: 247). 
43
 See for instance, Article 3 on the integrity of the person, Article 8 on protection of personal date and Article 25 
on the rights of the elderly. 
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while in others there are no particular articles, for example on the right to 
democracy and the guarantee of the rights of a minority
44
. Moreover, many key 
rights in the field of social rights are missing, either not included or linked to the 
rules laid down by national or EU legislation (Chalmers et al. 2010: 239f). In the 
same respect, there is a peculiar relation of the EU with ECHR. Even though the 
Charter and the Treaties hold a provision for the former to accede the latter, this 
did not happen, at least up to the time of writing this sentence. This means that 
Union citizens have no opportunity of bringing complaints against the EU 
institutions directly before the European Court of Human Rights (Krüger 2004: 
xxiii). Thus, the current level of protection demanded of EU actions is lower than 
that for the MS and that only where the actions are ‘manifestly deficient’ will a 
breach be found (Chalmers et al. 2010: 229). 
This new governmentality of human rights did not come along without 
struggles as it faced and faces several problems in its enactment. The initial 
rationality was to fully enact and make the Charter legally binding with the 
Constitutional Treaty. But since the latter failed in the 2004, the whole ‘European 
governance’ regime had to find other ways to reinforce its mentalities. The 
Charter was later incorporated in ToL and its equal legal standing with the 
Treaties was established in Article 6.1 TEU; however there is still national 
contestation on its applicability. For instance, in the Protocol no. 30 annexed to 
the Treaties on the application of the Charter to Poland and the UK, it is clearly 
stated that the Charter does not extend the ability of the Court or any Polish or 
British court or tribunal to “find that the laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions, practices or action […] are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, 
freedoms and principles that [the Charter] reaffirms” [Article 1.1]. 
To conclude, up until the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, and mainly 
after 2004, the Advocate Generals, the General Court and the Court themselves 
referred to the Charter as an alternative – and not exclusive – source of 
fundamental rights for Union citizens (Chalmers et al. 2010: 238). In any case, it 
has been argued that the level of protection offered to the Union citizens-holders 
of these rights has been unclear (Chalmers et al. 2010: 229), with the rights 
provided in the Charter becoming more or less just paper rights with no substance 
(Chalmers et al. 2010: 241). However, as we can see the Charter provides for 
specific remedies in Articles 8, 17 and 41 in relation to the Union’s position 
towards its citizens, even though the nature of remedies in general is not indicated 
in the Charter apart from that they have to be ‘effective’. But, as Shelton explains, 
the Court when seeking to repair a damaged cause by the EU, it applies the 
general principles common to the laws of the MS related to state liability
45
 and so 
on (2004: 360). 
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 Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 21 protecting membership of a national minority from 
discrimination and of Article 22 for respect of cultural, religious and linguistic diversity. 
45
 For instance, see Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur v Germany and R v Secretary of 
State for Transport, ex part Factortame (No. 3) [1996] ECR I-1029, where the Court indicated its approach to 
remedies due to applicants whose rights have been violated. Particularly one can find the three criteria that must 
be met for state liability to apply.  
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5.3 Subjectification through performance/ control 
Again, the above legal analysis on what is citizenship and rights in the EU, does 
not present in itself the full picture. The legal subjectification of Union citizens by 
itself would not have any particular meaning without actual implementation. One 
such venue of implementation was the European Ombudsman established in 1995. 
This institution was expected to improve transparency as it “embodies the idea 
that governmental apparatuses should be subject to a continuous monitoring [and] 
that administrative practices must be scrutinized by the critical gaze of the public 
eye so that instances of maladministration can be reproached” (Walters and Haahr 
2005b: 76). It also serves as a venue for Union citizens to register and address 
their complaints can be registered and addressed. What is more, it serves as a 
mechanism that assists individuals in becoming involved in their government, as 
conscientious citizens are insisting on their right to be treated correctly by 
European institutions, rationality which objectifies Union citizens as active and 
self-conscious, who are to be accorded a certain respect (Walters and Haahr 
2005b: 76). 
Nonetheless, the best example of how the subjectification works in practice is 
through the agencies developed under the Commission. The formulation of 
agencies can be understood as part of the re-establishment of the European space 
of government promoted with the ‘European governance.’ Over the past two 
decades more than thirty agencies have been established in a wide variety of 
policy areas, and through them the EU “quietly managed to expand its regulatory 
capacity without directly increasing the size or capacity of the […] European 
Commission” (Kelemen and Majone 2012: 220). The official rationality behind 
this move is to “enhance the credibility of long-term policy commitments” by 
delegating the implementation of policy objectives to politically independent 
institutions” (Kelemen and Majone 2012: 225). The underlying discourse is to 
govern from far way, as less as possible and as efficient as possible. These 
agencies work through the technologies of agency and performance by 
controlling, regulating, and also ‘letting’ the government subjects free to govern 
themselves as well. Again here the government subjects are both MS and 
individuals. 
One agency is worth mentioning in particular. The European Monitoring 
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia established first in 1997 and then succeeded a 
decade later by the Fundamental Rights Agency [hereinafter FRA], with the 
mission “to provide EU and member state institutions with assistance and 
expertise on fundamental rights when implementing Community law, and to 
support them in formulating and taking measures” (Kelemen and Majone 2012: 
221). The establishment of FRA came as a necessity because it was considered 
insufficient of not only violating fundamental rights. Following from the mission 
of FRA, we can understand how it functions through power/knowledge. It brings 
along all different aspects of the ‘European governance’ governmentality: 
collective learning and guidance, flexible and informal modes of governing, 
power sharing, networks of experts, reliance upon statistics which are the form of 
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making information and data on rights intelligible (Sokhi-Bulley 2013: 230). It 
has the power to publish reports, collect data on fundamental rights and to issue 
opinions for the EU legislature (Chalmers et al. 2010: 229; 264f). 
The Panopticon discussed previously is present here as well. As Sokhi-Bulley 
argued, FRA’s type of government is best understood as surveillance (2011: 684), 
even though it conceals its panoptic function under its self-representation as a 
model of apolitical progress (Sokhi-Bulley 2011: 685). Through this panoptic 
surveillance, the ‘observatory monitoring’ according as the Commission calls it 
(Sokhi-Bulley 2011: 693), the FRA gathers data and information, produces 
knowledge about the governmentable subjects of EU, which then releases through 
its annual reports, thematic reports and surveys (Sokhi-Bulley 2011: 693). These 
knowledges define the subjects to be governed, both the MS and the Union 
citizens. The underlying discourse promotes the trinity victim – savage – saviour 
(cf. Sokhi-Bulley 2013: 239). The savage of course is the ‘bad’ MS, the victim is 
the Union citizen whose rights are undermined, and the saviour is the EU through 
the FRA in this case. 
Let us take them one by one. As part of what the rationality promoted with 
OMC, the MS are governed based on their ‘freedom’ to use the knowledge 
developed by FRA [technology of agency and involvement] in order to apply 
fundamental rights ‘correctly’, and also based on their actions [technology of 
performance] which are compared with the ‘good practice’ indicators provided by 
the FRA (Sokhi-Bulley 2011: 696), and also through the responses of Union 
citizens to the FRA surveys. Two subjectifications of the MS are provided: the 
‘idea states’ protecting human rights and the ‘bad states’ whose actions must be 
corrected. The same happens with Union citizens. Firstly, the FRA observes the 
Union citizens through socio-legal methods such as interviews and surveys and 
gathers knowledges based on a dual subjectification of the citizen: the ‘ideal 
citizen’ suffering no discrimination and the ‘victim’ suffering discrimination 
(Sokhi-Bulley 2011: 700). When participating in these surveys, citizens give part 
of their freedom, become cases that have to act within a framework of pre-given 
questions and answers, and thus allow themselves to be pinpointed, defined and 
classified (Brass 2000: 308). This is connected with the rationality of the Christian 
pastoralism discussed previously, which provided salvation of the souls only if a 
certain truth of the individuals was produced through confessions. FRA’s surveys 
have this confessional element, aiming at producing a given ‘truth’ for the well-
being of Union citizens. And the questions refer to every aspect of the 
interviewee’s existence and the space of interaction is managed through a list of 
already constructed scenarios for all the possible answers that can be given 
(Sokhi-Bulley 2013: 237-8). 
This category is contrasted to the ‘ideal citizen’ defined by law as described in 
the previous section. The ‘victim’ is the category that must be ‘rescued’ – and 
here comes the third person of the trinity, the deus ex machina incarnated in the 
EU. In any case, the constructed category of the ‘victim’ is actually a very useful 
political category (Sokhi-Bulley 2013: 238). The existence of the ideal, safe and 
secure Europe as defined in Article 2 TEU mentioned previously relies on the 
production of the ‘abjects,’ the ‘victims’ that are ‘undesirable’. Of course, it is not 
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‘always’ their fault, since the savage MS are to be blamed. But only partly, as the 
‘victims’ also share the responsibility to perform in a certain way, discipline 
themselves just as the MS do, by accepting human rights as “the code of correct 
moral conduct” (Sokhi-Bulley 2011: 702), what they ought to aspire to. 
Remember the example of the unemployed person Dean presented in explaining 
how the technologies of government work in practice
46
? In this case, the EU 
would be like saying: ‘we are giving you everything possible to be as free citizens 
as possible, as long as you do it the way we are here to show you.’ And this 
achieved in three parts: (a) through the interaction of the individuals as Union 
citizens with the agency, (b) with the acquirement of knowledge not only about 
FRA’s work and on the EU fundamental rights but also of the type of ‘ideal 
citizen’, and (c) with the engagement of the individual responsibility for the 
enactment of this type (Sokhi-Bulley 2013: 234). This is how FRA imagines and 
aims to produce the active, well-educated, informed and responsible subject, 
completing thus the subjectification of Union citizens needed in the context of the 
advanced liberal ‘European governance’ regime. 
5.4 Potentials for subjectivation 
As mentioned multiple times, already, governing works in two levels. Up until 
now I discussed how the EU conducts, shapes and governs the area and the 
populations of Europe through the advanced liberal mentality of governance and 
fundamental rights, all reflected in Union citizenship. In this section I will discuss 
the potential that Union citizenship presents for individuals to subjectivate 
themselves, govern their conducts as citizens in a particular way. This 
demonstrates the reciprocal nature of power relations, already expected based on 
Foucault’s reconceptualizations of power. I will try to retrace these potentials 
based on Foucault’s ideas, and also present some hypotheses on the limitations 
within which the Union citizen can act in this respect
47
. This discussion can be 
found in Foucault’s work on ethics. He approached ethics, not as a moralistic 
metaphysical philosophy, but as a practice, an embodiment, a style of life, an 
ethos, a relation of one with oneself (cf. Rabinow 1997). More particularly, he 
promoted an ethic of permanent resistance. 
It was implied already that power and resistance are conditions of possibility 
for each other (Simons 1995: 81). History, after all, is understood from the 
Foucauldian standpoint as the outcome of the struggles between different ‘regimes 
of truth’, between official and subjugated knowledges, between discourses and 
counter-discourses that eventually produce new ‘arts of government’, new 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
46
 See footnote 18. 
47
 Here I will try to be as less normative as possible; however since Foucault was an engaged philosopher in 
Sartrean terms, this distancing might be almost impossible. In any case, this discussion only demonstrates the 
different potentials and limitations available, not what is to be done. 
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mentalities, discontinuities with the previous systems, and so on. For Foucault, the 
political problem at hand is ‘truth’ itself, i.e. not about changing people’s 
consciousness but about changing “the political, economic, institutional regime of 
the production of truth” ([1976] 2001a: 132f). And permanent resistance is what 
enables the agonistic relations in which new subjectivities, new modes of 
government, and new practices are developed
48
 (Simons 1995: 6). 
Most importantly, though, resistance as political dissent, as refusal to obey 
exposes the limits of power per se. To some extent, all political power is 
conditional upon cooperation and obedience (Simons 1995: 85). As discussed 
previously, the ‘right to question’ is a given in the liberal political government as 
the conduct of the population is achieved through rights and freedoms, as 
described before. Thus, the space for individuals to subjectivate themselves is 
already constructed through their subjectification through law and others. The 
important point is the certain agency individuals have to subjectivate themselves 
‘differently,’ not in the expected way. System’s presupposition is that the 
individual can be indignant and talk against the government in a ‘lyrical’ way and 
that the government will reflect and act upon the citizens’ reactions, as a theatrical 
division of labour, which Foucault said it can/must be rejected ([1981] 2001a: 
475). 
Following the Foucauldian discussion, we can call this ‘ideal’ 
subjectification/subjectivation of the individual as ‘docility.’ In his study of the 
Classical period, Foucault discussed the discovery of the ‘docile’ body as an 
object and target of power, a body that can be manipulated, shaped, trained, which 
obeys, responds, becomes skilful and increases forces ([1975] 1984: 180). This 
body was the locus of governmental conduct as, through different 
governmentalities, knowledges and dispositifs, individuals were shaped into 
subjects. The ‘docility’ was an important element of this body, as it was 
constructed in a way that would make it possible to subject, use, transform and 
improve it for the purposes of government ([1975] 1984: 181). Mutatis mutandis, 
I would argue that Union citizens are normalised/ constructed as ‘docile’ 
categories, and the whole power/knowledge system lies on the control of these 
docile subjects while they exercise their freedom/rights. 
But here lies the potentiality of challenging the system of powers. If one 
develops a critical attitude, understood as a movement through which the subject 
gives itself the right to question truth and power (Cadman 2010: 547), one might 
be able to reject these theatrical roles of docility. This could happen exactly when 
citizens rise with indignation and speak up simply by exercising their rights of 
representation. I will connect the above discussion of ‘docile’ body with 
Foucault’s example of the ‘dangerous’ individual, a criminal standing in a tribunal 
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 For instance, one can see the active and performative ‘right to question’ developed with the struggle between 
the pastoral power and the pastoral counter-conducts developed with the Reformation and the Counter-
Reformation movements, the active movements which pursued different kinds and agents of conduct in the 
sixteenth century (Cadman 2010: 543). The gradual transition from pastoralism to political government, then, 
can be seen as emerging through the general crisis of the former and successful conduct of the latter (Cadman 
2010: 544). 
 43 
 
of the Classical period. As in the present case with the EU, the judicial system 
then expected the criminal to act in docility. The criminal had the right/obligation 
to state and defend their case. In order for the judges to condemn them, they 
needed specific answers from the criminal in the question “who are you?” which 
meant that the criminal had to do self-examination, confess, explain of and reveal 
everything about oneself ([1978] 2001a: 177). The judicial system and penal 
machine needed this knowledge in order to function. In Foucault’s example, the 
penal system is challenged when the ‘dangerous’ individual decides to keep silent. 
The “presiding judge is relentless, the jury is upset,” they “urge, they push the 
accused,” who in turn “does not play the game” ([1978] 2001a: 177). When the 
accused decides not to participate, “the judicial machine ceases to function” 
([1978] 2001: 200). 
Likewise in the case of EU, I would argue that the governmental system lies 
on the perfect enactment of Union citizenship as docile category. This 
unobstructed and active exercise of citizenship, the ‘correct’ enactment of 
citizenship through the continuous exercise of the rights given to Union citizens, 
is the cornerstone of the existence of EU governance system to begin with. So, I 
would suppose that if Union citizens decide to terminate all enactments of their 
Union rights and refuse to participate in the present game of government this 
could function as an important counter-conduct. This counter-conduct could mean 
a ‘revolt’ towards the system at hand. Foucault clarified that the right of an 
individual, a group, a minority or an entire people to say on their impulse “I will 
no longer obey”, and thus throw “the risk of their life in the face of an authority 
they consider unjust” is irreducible, especially since no authority is capable of 
making it impossible ([1979] 2001a: 449). 
A less extreme potential for citizens to react can be found in the ancient Greek 
notion of parrhesia, or the act of speaking with frankness and fearlessness, which 
could serve as an ideal counter-conduct of citizens challenging the conducts 
applied on them. Parrhesia, first, presupposes that one says everything that one 
has in mind, without withholding anything, but giving a complete and exact 
account of their opinion with frankness ([1983] 2001b: 12). This does not mean 
that parrhesia is ‘chattering’ about everything without qualification ([1983] 
2001b: 13). Instead, parrhesia entails the telling of the ‘truth,’ which is in the eye 
of the beholder – the speaker says what they believe to be true ([1983] 2001b: 14). 
Moreover, the fact that “a speaker says something dangerous – different from 
what the majority believes,” that is the courage that the speaker shows, is an 
indication that what they say is true ([1983] 2001b: 15). The aspect of danger is 
important in the act of parrhesia. This act presupposes that one risking even their 
life by telling their truth without restrains. One risks oneself, when one critically 
stands before the interlocutor as the latter might become angry with the ‘truth’ 
([1983] 2001b: 17). Also, one risks oneself in one’s own present, which means 
that when one is challenging the governmental truth and the conduct of their 
conduct, they are also problematising their own subjective identities as actors 
(Cadman 2010: 547). 
Most importantly, no one is obliged to enter the ‘parrhesiastic game.’ As 
Foucault explained, a person choosing to act with parrhesia also chooses a 
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specific relationship to oneself, by preferring to speak out the truth rather than 
living a life of being false to oneself ([1983] 2001b: 17). There is also a 
precondition for someone to use parrhesia: that one knows one’s own genealogy 
and status ([1983] 2001b: 18). In the ancient Athenian democracy, parrhesia was 
related to the freedom and the duty of the citizen ([1983] 2001b: 19), essential 
both as a guideline for democracy and an ethical-personal attitude characteristic of 
the ‘good’ citizen (Foucault [1983] 2001b: 22). The same goes with the citizens in 
the liberal context. They have the right to talk, but they can use this right in a 
docile manner, reproducing the theatrical division of labour aforementioned, or 
they can use if for challenging the system. This would be done, for instance, when 
one asks certain truths about the governors’ ultimate aims, actions and decisions 
(Cadman 2010: 551). 
Foucault saw a certain international citizenship that “obliges one to speak out 
against every abuse of power,” since all are “members of the community of the 
governed, and thereby obliged to show mutual solidarity” ([1981] 2001a: 474). 
Here, questioning also means to publicise the situation of those who are not 
governed fairly, those who are exempted from what Arendt called the ‘rights to 
have rights’ (Cadman 2010: 552). For Foucault, it is the duty of citizens to bring 
“the testimony of people’s suffering to the eyes and ears of governments” as the 
“suffering of men [sic] must never be a silent residue of policy”, and this grounds 
“an absolute right to stand up and speak to those who hold power” ([1981] 2001a: 
474). Also, individuals through NGOs and so on, should intervene effectively in 
the sphere of international policy and strategy, and the monopoly of government 
should be taken little by little from the governments themselves ([1981] 2001a: 
475). 
But in any case, the ‘correct’ enactment of citizenship serves as a strategy of 
survival, since, as aforementioned, the system relies on this in order to be 
reproduced. Thus, a ‘wrong’ enactment of Union citizenship could initiate a set of 
punishments. Since the ‘normal’ enactment of Union citizenship in docility, as 
demonstrated again above, sustains the ‘correct’ reproduction of the system, a 
‘wrong’ conduct of citizenship, the act of parrhesia, revolt, dissent, any action 
away from the needed ‘docility’ could initiate a set of counter-conducts and 
punishments
49
. Or the danger might be more substantial as the possibility of the 
counter-conduct of Union citizens not being clearly understood by the 
governmentality system as important, and thus being dismissed as the outcome of 
mere fear and ignorance
50
. In any way, this aspect of danger should be taken into 
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 For instance, the negative result in the referendum that took place in Ireland in June 2008 for the Treaty of 
Lisbon was not acceptable, and thus the Irish people had to redo the referendum in October 2008, now with a 
positive result. The point I make here could serve as a hypothesis for a more detailed research. 
50
 This was the case, for instance, with the Dutch and French negative votes in the 2004 referenda for the 
Constitutional Treaty that were dismissed as “the result of an ‘explanation deficit,’ such as the failure of national 
politicians to explain the Treaty” or as “Europe becoming a ‘scapegoat’ for unpopular domestic reforms”: in 
short, voters who rejected the Treaty had not voted against the Treaty at all; theirs was simply a ‘second-order 
referendum’ or protest vote fuelled by ignorance, prejudice or some other irrational motive (Shore 2011: 292). 
Also, based on the knowledge developed with Eurobarometer statistics, EU officials confirmed that 
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consideration as well, not as something negative, but again as a condition of 
possibility (cf. Simons 1995: 3). 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
All in all, following the above discussion, one should refrain from understanding 
the subjectification of Union citizens presented in the previous sections as 
something bad. As Sokhi-Bulley explains, there are several advantages of the 
conceptualisation presented by advanced liberalism is that the ‘right to question,’ 
the right and ability to resist the regimes of government applied on us is already 
pre-given in our subjectification as active, educated and responsible partners or 
empowered citizens-consumers (2013: 241). An important issue that must be 
clarified is the limits of such counter-conducts. The above discussion destabilises 
the category of Union citizenship. However, as already mentioned various 
instances in the text, the liberal governmentalities come along with such counter-
conducts presupposed. Thus, the above described potentialities for counter-
conducts lie in the centre of the present system of relations, not somewhere 
outside the system. This by itself is neither good nor bad; rather presents the 
potentiality of actually being legitimised in challenging the system. 
As a concluding point, I want to refer to the present times. In connection to 
what was discussed above, even though respect for human rights gets a 
foundational status in the Treaties, the references to fundamental rights are 
“scarce and oblique,” as no catalogue of rights or any direct statement of how 
actors are bound by them exists (Chalmers et al. 2010: 230). I can understand that 
as part of the failure of the ‘European governance’ governmentality to achieve the 
constitutional expression it aimed for with the Constitutional Treaty. The regime 
reformed with ToL is a rather limited version of what was imagined/ intended. 
Thus, the analytics of government presented thus far should not be approached as 
an end product. For instance, the Court recently
51
 started challenging the cross-
boundary element which as discussed above serves as a precondition for Union 
citizenship and the rights deriving from this position (cf. Hinarejos 2011; 2012; 
Lenaerts 2013).  
  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Euroscepicism is highest among-less educated people, and this problem can be solved through better and more 
targeted information (Shore 2011: 293). 
51
 See Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177; Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375; Case C-
256/11 Dereci and others, judgment of 15 November 2011 (not yet reported). 
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6 Conclusion 
“[…] Would it 
not be easier, the government 
to dissolve the people and 
to elect another?” 
‘The Solution’, Bertolt Brecht 
In this thesis, I wanted to present a critical analytics of the EU and Union 
citizenship, building on Michel Foucault’s work, in order to understand what 
Union citizenship is, how it was developed to the formation it has today, the 
reasons behind this development, and its potentials per se. My aim was to explore 
and build on the conventional readings on Union citizenship, and move beyond 
them. I first explored the main political ideas of Foucault and identified the 
different parts of a foucauldian research. Then I divided my analytics into three 
parts/chapters. First in Chapter 3 I explored the predominant discourses on Union 
citizenship, clarified what we can learn from them and exposed their limitations in 
answering my question of interest. Second in Chapter 4 I presented a genealogy of 
the different mentalities related to the government of Europe from the initial steps 
taken in the post-war period up to the recent developments with ‘European 
governance.’ In this genealogy, I tried to identify the position of citizenship and 
the role it played. As presented, Union citizenship was never a given at any time. 
In the beginning, the European integration following Monnet’s rationality did not 
provide for European citizens. Rather this status came as a result of the Court’s 
activism and the problems of legitimacy that the European project was facing. 
This status was coupled with the concept of fundamental rights, which found its 
best expression in the ‘European governance’ mentality. Finally, in Chapter 5 I 
explored more in detail the ways Union citizens are subjectificated through law 
and in practice, and also the potentials that Union citizenship as status presents to 
individuals for subjectivating themselves differently. 
To reiterate something mentioned in Chapter 2, Foucault’s perspective is not 
interested in a normative appreciation of government. We are not exploring good 
or bad instances of government, but rather government as it is. This is the same in 
the present study. For instance, the critical discussion I presented in Chapter 5 on 
EU law and the FRA should not be understood as a cynical and nihilistic 
criticism. As mentioned in the literature, the EU through law reached an 
unprecedented level of protection of fundamental rights, and the FRA is seen as 
an emancipatory institution that makes human rights more effective (Sokhi-Bulley 
2011: 705). Furthermore, the Charter is an important step, as it secured greater 
visibility and accessibility to human rights, is an invaluable reference point in 
interpreting the content of those rights, and “encapsulates a broad range of 
principles, including key economic, social and cultural rights that remain 
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unprotected by any other pan-European judicial body” (Ward 2004: 140). As 
discussed above, the issue here is to explore the limitations and the potentialities. 
And indeed, as the previous chapter concluded, these are present throughout. 
At this moment, I bring in mind Foucault’s words: “[W]hat I am proposing is 
at once too much and too little. There are too many diverse kinds of relations, too 
many lines of analysis, yet at the same time these is too little necessary unity” 
([1978] 2001a: 228). The present thesis is packed with information. I tried to 
explore the multiplicity of understandings, which are all sumbola, parts of the 
bigger picture. Each of these parts can be broken down to smaller parts and have a 
genealogy of their own. Thus, what I presented here is not the ultimate ‘truth’, but 
one representation of the truth. In any case, the analytics of Union citizenship 
could have explored several other aspects as well. For example, what is the 
position of the different European institutions in the government through 
citizenship and rights? How is the ‘truth’ defined from their point of view? How is 
the Commission governing through freedom and control for the promotion of the 
‘ideal’ Europe? Also, how are MS incorporated in this governmental system 
through OMC? How is OMC working in practice as a mechanism of governing 
MS through freedom and control? Last but not least, how are other categories 
governed, for instance the non-Union citizens or other particular categories of 
Union citizens, be they women, LGBT individuals, Roma persons, and so on? 
And, how can we read the specific cases of indignation, revolt and talking-back, 
for instance in the case of the crisis movements in Spain, Greece and elsewhere? 
To end with Farage’s scaremongering that the European dream is crumbling, 
and the fact that the European population is feeling alienated from the European 
project, it is true that this was a constant characteristic of European integration, 
and all different mentalities of government proposed wanted to address it. These 
mentalities came to provide for the status of citizenship, as a way of including 
European population in their government and thus enhance EU’s legitimacy. This 
is the ‘solution,’ as Brecht would call it. In any case, one should avoid referring to 
a ‘European dream’ or project as a closed system. Entropy comes from within. 
What we are facing now could be better understood as an interregnum, a crisis 
expressed by the fact that “the old is dying and the new cannot be born” (Gramsci 
1976: 276). The future is open. And a Foucauldian analytics could help approach 
and address these possibilities and limitations in a critical light. 
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